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Notes & Comments
Ascertaining Duty of Care in the Life Insurance
Industry: A Survey of Insurance Law and a
Proposal for State Mandatory
Disclosure Legislation
Imagine the following: you have been diagnosed with a fatal
illness. Had the illness been detected early, you might have re-
sponded favorably to immediate and proper medical treatment.
Now imagine that a life insurance company discovered your partic-
ular illness, months ago, upon an examination it performed pursu-
ant to an application for life insurance. The insurance company,
however, never informed you of the results of the examination, and
in many jurisdictions is under no legal duty to do so.1
Despite the overwhelming health risks associated with nondis-
closure, numerous cases permit a life insurance company, with
knowledge of an individual's adverse medical condition, to remain
inactive. 2 Applicants that have submitted to such examinations
have lost potentially valuable treatment time. In addition, nondis-
closure can also result in exposing health risks to third parties. 3 In
New York, an insurer's duty to disclose the results of an applicant's
blood test that confirms a positive reading for the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus ("HIV") is imposed by statute.4 Although a stat-
utory duty is imposed in such circumstances, the duty to disclose
1 Nolan v. First Company Life Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 81 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2001);
Doe v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243 (D. Md. 1995); Doe v. Jackson
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S. Ct. 956, 136 L. Ed. 2d. 843 (1997); LoDico
v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361, 517 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dept. 1987); Petrosky v. Brasner,
695 N.Y.S.2d 281, 181 Misc. 2d 897 (1999), affd, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 729 A.D.2d 75
(1st Dep't 2001); appeal denied, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 1045 (N.Y. May 3, 2001); Ervin
v. Am. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 376 Pa. Super. 132, 545 A.2d 354 (1988). For a full
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 40-123 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 37-130 and accompanying text (exploring how failing to
notify an applicant of an adverse medical condition does not constitute actionable
negligence).
3 Such health risks include exposing third parties to tuberculosis, hepatitis,
and the Human Immunodeficiency Virus. See Part IV B of this Note for a detailed
discussion.
4 26 N.Y. INs. L. § 2611 (2001).
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does not extend to other potentially life-threatening situations.
5 It
is the position of this Note that such insurance disclosure legisla-
tion must be adopted for New York State residents as a means of
protecting the public welfare, both on the individual and collective
level.
Part I of this Note provides background information about the
insurance industry and the practice of underwriting. 6 Part II ana-
lyzes precedent and illustrates that other jurisdictions, which have
addressed the issue, have unilaterally concluded that a duty of dis-
closure does not exist without engaging in an analysis of the duty
issue.7 Part III proposes an extended duty of care to encompass
disclosure to applicants discovered to have an adverse medical con-
dition.8 It provides that other institutions that perform medical
screening examinations are under a legal duty to disclose, and
posits that this duty should be extended to the life insurance com-
pany.9 Part V discusses health risks posed to the insurance appli-
cant in addition to the general community associated with
nonmandatory disclosure.' 0 Part V presents legal and policy argu-
ments for mandatory disclosure legislation; it applies a risk-utility
analysis and introduces policy arguments which provide that the
current system cannot remain intact. I I Part VI advocates legislation
extending the benefits of New York State mandatory disclosure leg-
islation.' 2 Lastly, Part VII discusses how advances in genomic re-
search fuel concern for genetic discrimination.' 3 This Note
concludes with a discussion of how mandatory insurance disclosure
5 See, e.g., Petrosky, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281 (noting that under New York law, no
statutory duty exists imposing disclosure by an insurer, with exception to HIV test
results).
6 See infra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
7 The courts simply listed considerations of policy in determining whether a
duty exists without examination of the considerations. See Doe v. Jackson Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 496; Doe v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. at
251; Hannah E. Greenwald, What You Don't Know Could Save Your Life: A Case
for Federal Insurance Disclosure Legislation, 102 DICK. L. REV. 131, 136 (1997)
(noting courts' conclusory analysis). Infra notes 37-130 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 131-167 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 131-163 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 168-208 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 209-233 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 234-261 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 262-324 and accompanying text.
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legislation must be enacted to protect the insurance applicant's in-
terest in his or her personal medical information.
4
I. BACKGROUND ABOUT THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
A. Underwriting Process
Insurance is an "arrangement for transferring and distributing
risk."'15 When an individual applies for life insurance, the under-
writing process permits the insurance company to determine ex-
isting differences between their applicants, and then, to classify
these differences according to their corresponding prospective
risks. 16 Underwriting is defined as the "process by which a life in-
surance company determines whether or not it can accept an appli-
cation for life insurance, and if so, on what basis."' 7 The primary
purpose for the underwriting process is an attempt to accurately
predict future mortality and subsequent related costs so that insur-
ers are in a position to make informed decisions by identifying and
evaluating potential losses.1 8 Individual characteristics impacting
risk assessment include age, health history, general physical condi-
14 See infra notes 325-332 and accompanying text.
15 ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 1.2, at 2 (1971). For excellent dis-
cussions of the economics of risk and insurance, see EJAN MACKAAY, THE Eco-
NOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW, 173-180 (1982), and A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMIcs, 53-58 (2d ed., 1989).
16 Herman T. Bailey, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classifica-
tion, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 780 (1976). The ability to classify insurance appli-
cants protects insurance companies from "adverse selection," which is defined as
the "tendency of persons who are poorer risks to seek insurance to a greater extent
than do persons who are better risks." See also JANICE E. GREIDER ET AL., LAW
AND THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 400 (5 h ed. 1984). Without this classifica-
tion system, insurance companies would become insolvent. Id. See also JON S.
HANSON, REGULATION OF LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS, at 156-158, (1996) (noting
that a growing AIDS population threatens the insurance company's ability to con-
trol the risks associated with illness and death); WOLCOTT B. DUNHAM, JR., NEW
YORK INSURANCE LAW, Volume 2 at 32-36 (2000) (commenting that because an
insurer's acceptance and classification of risk is necessarily based upon the infor-
mation obtained through the medical examination, the accuracy of such informa-
tion is crucial to the exercise of sound business judgment); Judith A. Berman,
Current Legal Issues in AIDS: AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Un-
derwriting: A Paradigmatic Inquiry, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1059, 1068-1073 (evaluating
the economic rationale of risk classification).
17 AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK,
at 128 (1997).
18 Karen A. Clifford & Russell P. luculano, AIDS and Insurance: The Ratio-
nale for AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1987).
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tion, gender, occupation, and use of alcohol and tobacco. 19 "It is
the understanding of the way these various [characteristics] influ-
ence mortality that enables [life insurance] companies to classify
applicants into groups or classes with comparable mortality risks to
be charged appropriate premium rates."'20
A life insurance policy is medically underwritten on the basis
of health information obtained through an application process and
diagnostic testing. 21 The applicant is required to answer questions
about his or her personal medical history.22 In addition to these
inquiries, some insurance companies require medical examina-
tions.23 Typically, these exams are performed by paramedicals who
are licensed health professionals and who are often independent
contractors hired by the insurance company. 24 The paramedical's
role includes obtaining the applicant's medical history, physical
measurements, and diagnostic specimens. 25 Insurance companies
typically require urinalysis as a means for screening for medica-
tions, illegal drug use, and the presence of nicotine. 26 Blood
profiles are used to test for the presence of antibodies or antigens to
the HIV virus, cholesterol and related lipids, diabetes, heart risk
factors, antibodies to hepatitis, immune disorders, and to assess the
proper functioning of the liver and kidneys. 27 Blood tests are also
used to test for malignancies. 28 More specialized procedures in-
19 Id. See also R. MEHR, E. CAMMAK & T. ROSE, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE
at 657-659 ( 8th ed. 1985); C. WILL, LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY UNDERWRITING 6,
8-19 (1964); 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 780 (1976).
20 WILL, supra note 19, at 6.
21 JOSEPH MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 250-256 (1962); DUNHAM, supra note
16, at 32-6 (2000).
22 See MACLEAN, supra note 21, at 250-256. See also HARRY P. KAMEN &
WILLIAM J. TOPPETA, THE LIFE INSURANCE LAW OF NEW YORK: PAPER
PRESENTED TO THE ASSOCIATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COUNSEL, at 243 (1989);
DUNHAM, supra note 16, at 32-36 (2000).
23 See MACLEAN, supra note 21, at 250-256; HANSON, supra note 15, at 158;
KAMEN & TOPPETTA, supra note 22, at 243; DUNHAM, supra note 16, at 32-6
(2000).
24 Lisa Karam Middleton, Life Insurance Medical Exams at http://moneycen-
tral.msn.com.article/insure/life/5077.asp (last visited November 5, 2001).
25 Id.
26 See MACLEAN, supra note 20, at 252.
27 See Greenwald, supra, note 7 at 136. Since the 1980's almost all life insur-
ers have screened applicants for AIDS. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Aids and Insurance:
How Private Health Coverage Relates to HIV/AIDS Infection and to Public Pro-
grams, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1561, 1585 (1992).
28 See Greenwald, supra, note 7.
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clude electrocaridiograms, which are used to assess heart function.
29
An underwriter then reviews the life insurance application and the
results of the medical exam.30 Based on these factors, the company
will either extend an offer for coverage, decline the insurance cov-
erage applied for, or make an offer to issue insurance coverage at a
higher than standard rate.
31
B. Insurability Condition Precedent to Contractual Liability
The creation of a valid and enforceable life insurance contract
is no different from the creation of most forms of contracts. 32 Cus-
tomarily, the completion of the insurance application merely consti-
tutes an offer to contract. 33 The insurance contract is not complete
until the offer is accepted by the insurer.34 Thus, life insurance cov-
erage is conditioned on the applicant's insurability. 35 Due to the
absence of a contractual relationship with an applicant who is not
an insurable risk, courts reason that a life insurance company does
not owe a duty of disclosure to an applicant.
36
II. MEDICAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE CASES
Applicable precedent provides that plaintiffs in insurance non-
disclosure cases have not prevailed. 37 In repeatedly ruling in favor
29 Id. See also, Robert Goldstone, How to Sell Clients on Underwriting, NA-
TIONAL UNDERWRITING, September 1991, at 7, 8.
30 DUNHAM, supra note 16, at 32-6 (2000).
31 See generally, HOLMES, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, § 10.2; Petrosky v.
Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (respondent attempted to offer proposed policy
based on "tobacco rates.").
32 HOLMES, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, § 10.2., § 10.1; KAMEN & TOPPETTA,
supra note 22, at 150-151; Goldberg v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 284 A.D. 678, 679-
680, 134 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (2d Dept. 1954), appeal dismissed, 308 N.Y. 958, 127
N.E.2d 99 (1955).
33 HOLMES § 10.2.
34 Id.
35 KAMEN & ToPPETIrA, supra note 22, at 243; DUNHAM, supra note 16, at
32-6 (2000); COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 24:1.
36 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7.
37 Id.; Nolan v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. 2001)
(holding that no duty exists requiring insurance companies to disclose all pre-insur-
ance examination results); Doe v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243 (D.
Md. 1995) (holding that no professional and expert position was assumed by in-
surer with respect to plaintiff's physical condition and well-being, and therefore,
claim of negligence must fail as a matter of law); Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
944 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (holding that an insurer has no duty to inform
an insurance applicant of the results of a medical examination where the insurer
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of the life insurance companies, the courts have proceeded on a
negligence analysis, reasoning that insurance companies do not owe
a duty to the applicant, and therefore, failure to notify the applicant
of an adverse medical condition does not constitute a breach of
duty.38 As such, courts generally have not imposed liability on life
insurance companies. 39
In Jane Doe v. Prudential Life Insurance Company,40 Jane Doe
completed an application for life insurance with Prudential Life In-
surance Company ("Prudential"). 41 A laboratory representative
visited the Doe's home to conduct the medical exam, which in-
cluded a blood test.42 The informed consent form stated that the
blood sample would be subjected to testing that may include a de-
termination of the presence of antibodies or antigens to HIV, other
blood constituents, and drugs.43 Jane found the tests unobjection-
able, reviewed and signed the form, and submitted to the tests.
44
administers the examination only to determine the insurability of the applicant);
LoDico v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361 (4th Dept. 1.987) (providing that an examination
conducted solely for the purpose of determining insurability is an insufficient basis
on which to impose a duty); Petrosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1999) (holding
that insurer had no duty to disclose data it obtained pursuant to an application for
life insurance); Ervin v. Am. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 376 Pa. Super. 132, 545 A.2d
354 (1988) (affirming trial court's ruling that recovery will be denied for a failure
by a physician, employed by an insurance company, to disclose the presence of
cardiac abnormalities pursuant to a medical examination).
38 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 138-148, discussing how courts have relied on
the common law in holding that no duty exists by insurance companies to their
applicants.
39 See generally, id., discussing the delineated cases supra note 37, (not in-
cluding Petrosky) in the federal context, and remarking on the courts' failure to
impose a duty. Greenwald advocates for the Medical Privacy in the Age of New
Technologies Act (H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. 2), which focuses solely on applicant
accessibility to health information (rather than affirmative disclosure to appli-
cants), and remedies for breaches of confidentiality resulting from nonconsented
disclosure to third parties; it is the position of this Note the New York must enact
its own state regulation policies without delay. This Note highlights the need for
mandatory disclosure legislation in New York by incorporating the recent Petrosky
case (2001), where the court erroneously analyzed the duty issue, in part, because
of the absence of New York precedent. This Note also provides a proposed state
statute regulating insurance disclosure in the APPENDIX.
40 860 F. Supp 243 (D. Md. 1995).
41 Id. at 245.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 245-246
44 Id. at 246.
2001] DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION 57
The blood test confirmed that Jane was HIV positive. 45 Pru-
dential rejected Jane's application for life insurance based on the
results of the blood test.46 The rejection letter stated that the appli-
cation was denied because of "the results of [Jane's] blood test.
47
Jane requested that Prudential apprise her of the test results; Pru-
dential opted not to honor her request, stating it was the company's
preference to release the results to a physician.48 Jane again re-
quested that the test results be released directly to her, and again,
Prudential refused. 49 At the time Prudential rejected the applica-
tion, Jane was eight months pregnant and an illicit drug user.50 She
assumed that Prudential rejected her application because the blood
test revealed the presence of illegal substances. 51 Jane feared that
her child would be removed from her care if a physician discovered
that she was an illicit drug user; she therefore chose not to desig-
nate a physician.
52
Following the birth of her child, Jane remained unaware of her
HIV-positive status until more than twenty months after her appli-
cation for insurance.53 Jane subsequently commenced a negligence
suit against Prudential, alleging that she was deprived of "an early
opportunity to obtain appropriate and necessary medical treatment,
which would have significantly increased her life expectancy. '54 The
court denied recovery, reasoning that under Maryland common
law, Prudential did not owe a duty to Jane because of the absence
of any case law holding a duty to disclose under similar circum-
stances.55 The court further noted that no statutory duty existed
since legislation had not been enacted within the state that ad-
dressed this issue.56 In its duty analysis, the court stated that the
45 Id.
46 860 F. Supp at 246.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 860 F. Supp 243.
50 Id. at 247
51 Id.
52 860 F. Supp at 247.
53 Id. In the course of her treatment for a wrist injury, Jane received a cor-
tisone injection. The physician accidentally pricked his own finger with the needle.
As a precautionary measure, the physician asked Jane to submit written authoriza-
tion to Prudential to release the results of her blood test, which confirmed a posi-
tive HIV reading.
54 Id. at 245.
55 Id. at 251.
56 Id.
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duty element in a negligence action is "an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the plaintiff is entitled to protection. ' 57 Such considerations
include:
The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.58
Despite acknowledging these considerations, the court precipi-
tately concluded that no duty existed without analyzing these policy
considerations. 59 In addition, in considering the breach element,
the court concluded that, even assuming a duty existed, Prudential
fulfilled its duty by the its willingness to release Jane's test results to
a physician.60 The court found that Jane was contributorily negli-
gent for her own injuries because "[o]ne simple act on [her] part
would have avoided any harm which resulted from her failure to
know ... that she was HIV positive."
'61
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
presented with similar facts in Doe v. Jackson National Life Insur-
ance Company.62 In Jackson, the court ruled that the life insurance
company had no obligation to disclose to the applicant that he
tested positive for the AIDS virus.63 The applicant, Frank Der-
amus, submitted to blood tests in accordance with Jackson's under-
writing policies.64 The results of the blood test revealed that he was
57 Id.
58 Id. (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53 at 358 ( 5 th ed.
1984)).
59 860 F. Supp at 252.
60 Id. at 253.
61 Id. at 254.
62 Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), affg 944 F.
Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S. Ct. 956, 136 L. Ed.
2d. 843 (1997).
63 944 F. Supp at 497.
64 944 F. Supp at 490.
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HIV positive. 65 However, Jackson never informed Deramus or his
physician of his HIV status.66 Deramus was sent a rejection letter,
and thereafter requested that all medical information be forwarded
to his physician. 67 After receiving no response, Deramus made the
same request in a second letter; Jackson still did not honor the re-
quest, because, as Jackson asserted, "there was absolutely no under-
taking to protect [the applicant and his wife] from any health care
risk. "68
Eighteen months after Jackson discovered his HIV condition,
Deramus learned that he was HIV positive during a hospital stay. 69
Deramus requested a third time that Jackson submit the results of
his medical exam to his physician.70 Nine days before his death,
Jackson finally sent the results of his medical examination, includ-
ing the results of his HIV test to Deramus' physician. 71
Following his death, Deramus' wife commenced suit claiming
that Jackson breached its duty to disclose the results of her hus-
band's blood tests.72 The court however, entered summary judg-
ment in favor of Jackson, concluding that "an insurer has no duty to
inform an insurance applicant of the results of a medical examina-
tion where the insurer administers the examination only to deter-
mine the insurability of the applicant. ' 73 The plaintiff offered
multiple legal theories as a basis for a legally imposed duty.74 She
asserted that Jackson had a duty of disclosure because a "confiden-
tial relationship" evolved between Jackson and Deramus because of
the company's access to his personal medical information. 75 The




68 Brief for Appellee at 41, Deramus (No. 60675).
69 944 F. Supp at 491. During this time, Deramus received no treatment for
the disease and, unaware of his condition, repeatedly exposed his wife to the dis-
ease. "In sleeping in my husband's arms, the safest place I knew of, I was sleeping
with one of the deadliest diseases known to mankind," says Jody Deramus, Frank's
widow. "The company that insured his life knew all this so very well, yet neither I
nor my husband could know." See Curtis Rist, Deadly Secret: Frank Deramus Was
Dying, But His Insurer Didn't Tell Him Why, PEOPLE, October 7, 1996, at 73.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 489.
73 Id.
74 944 F. Supp at 493-498.
75 Id. at 492.
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ship to exist, one must justifiably expect the other to protect him or
her from risk. The court stated:
[Jackson] in no way misled [the applicant] into any in-
action. [Jackson] never promised that [Jackson] would
warn [the applicant] of any medical risks . . . nor did
[Jackson] ever advise that its silence was to the specific
result of the medical exam should be construed as a
positive medical finding ... This set of circumstances
hardly shows any justifiable reliance by [the applicant]
that [Jackson] would do anything other than perform
the limited function of a life insurance business.76
The court further stated that an insurance company should not
be held to the same standards as physicians. 77 In rejecting the claim
that Jackson had a duty to warn of foreseeable harm,78 the court
found no evidence demonstrating that the company's failure to dis-
close the applicant's test results proximately caused Deramus'
death, because he: (1) was HIV positive before applying for life
insurance; (2) was on notice that Jackson found him uninsurable for
medical reasons; (3) knew that Jackson had conducted blood tests;
and (4) was under private medical care. 79 For these reasons, the
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.80
Most decisional law provides that liability is denied due to the
absence of a physician-patient relationship.81 This was the reason-
ing employed in LoDico v. Caputi,82 where the court held that
where a doctor conducts an examination solely for an insurance
company, the doctor is not liable to the examinee for failure to di-
agnose a latent medical condition. 83 Plaintiff, LoDico, injured him-
self during the course of employment, and filed for worker's
compensation benefits. 84 The insurance carrier's physician ex-
amined him, and forwarded a report to the insurance company,
stating that, in his opinion, LoDico could return to work without
76 Id.
77 Id. at 493.
78 Id. at 495.
79 Id. at 495-496.
80 Id. at 496.
81 See LoDico v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361; see also generally, Greenwald supra
note 7.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 362.
84 Id.
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restrictions or limitations.85 Subsequent to the examination,
LoDico was diagnosed as having a brainstem tumor.8 6
Plaintiff commenced a medical malpractice action, asserting
that the physician committed malpractice in failing to diagnose the
brainstem tumor.87 LoDico is illustrative of a court's reluctance to
allow recovery for negligence against a physician in the absence of a
physician-patient relationship. The court found that no such rela-
tionship existed-express, implied, or contractual-that would indi-
cate a breach of professional duty to LoDico.8 8 The court reasoned
that the physician was performing services solely for the insurance
company-plaintiff did not independently solicit him, nor did
LoDico contend that he sought medical advice or treatment from
the physician.89
Jackson and Prudential highlight the need for mandatory insur-
ance disclosure legislation in an effort to prevent loss of treatment
time and health risks to third parties that can result from the highly
infectious HIV virus. Currently, in New York, an insurer's duty to
disclose the results of an HIV test that forms a basis for an adverse
underwriting decision 90 is imposed by statute.91 Section 2611 of the
New York Insurance Law provides:
In the event that an insurer's adverse underwriting de-
cision is based in whole or in part on the result of an
HIV related test, the insurer shall notify the individual
of the adverse underwriting decision and ask the indi-
vidual to elect in writing, unless the individual has al-
ready done so, whether to have the specific HIV
related test results disclosed directly to the individual
or to such other person as the individual may desig-
nate. If the individual elects to receive the HIV related
test results directly, the insurer shall advise the individ-
ual that he or she may call the department of health's
statewide toll-free telephone number for further infor-
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 129 A.D.2d at 362.
88 Id. at 363.
89 Id. at 363-364.
90 An "adverse underwriting decision" means: (A) a declination of insur-
ance coverage as applied for; or (B) an offer to issue insurance coverage at a
higher than standard rate. See 26 N.Y. Ins. L. § 2611.
91 26 N.Y. Ins. L. § 2611.
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mation about AIDS, the meaning of HIV related test
results, and the availability and location of HIV related
counseling services and shall also advise such individ-
ual to consult with a physician about the meaning of
and need for counseling, where appropriate, as to the
HIV related test results.92
Despite the life insurer's legal duty in New York to disclose the
results of an HIV test to an applicant, no such duty exists if the test
results yield other adverse medical conditions. 93 In Petrosky v.
Brasner,94 a case of first impression in New York, the court was
confronted with the question of whether an insurer had a duty to
disclose unfavorable electrocardiogram results to an applicant.95
Frank Petrosky sought life insurance through United States Life In-
surance Company ("US Life"). 96 In connection with Petrosky's ap-
plication, Examination Medical Services ("EMSI") conducted
medical tests, which included blood and urine samples, and an elec-
trocardiogram.97 US Life rejected Petrosky's application, but of-
fered a proposed policy for a shorter term and one-half the
coverage which was based upon, according to US Life, "tobacco
rates."98 Petrosky alleged that he unsuccessfully attempted to con-
tact his US Life insurance agent on several occasions. 99 Approxi-
mately forty-five days after US Life received his test results, Frank
92 Article 26 N.Y. Ins. L. § 2611(c). The statute defines AIDS as Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome as it may be defined from time to time by the Cen-
ters for Disease Control of the United States Public Health Service. See N.Y. Ins.
L. § 2611(d)(2).
93 See Petrosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 285, supra note 2. On appeal, the
court stated that had the Legislature intended to extend to extend the duty to
other circumstances, it would have expressly done so. 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343. The
dissent rejected the majority's suggestion that it must be inferred from 26 N.Y. Ins.
L. § 2611(c) that the Legislature intended that no duty be imposed upon insurers
to disclose test results of any kind other than HIV test results. See infra note 234.
See also Nolan v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. 2001) (reaf-
firming Petrosky by holding that imposition of a duty is best left to the policy mak-
ing branch of the government-the Legislature: "It is not a function of a court to
expand legislation as a court might think more desirable."). Id. at 87.
94 695 N.Y.S.2d 281, 181 Misc. 2d 897 (1999).
95 695 N.Y.S.2d at 283-284.
96 Id. at 283.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 283-284 (blood chemistry report indicated that applicant used
tobacco).
99 Id. at 284.
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Petrosky was brought to the emergency room, where he suffered a
fatal heart attack. l00 Petrosky's widow initiated suit against US
Life, EMSI, and other parties, claiming that a serious heart condi-
tion was implicated by the findings of the tests reported to US Life,
which breached its duty by denying Petrosky "the opportunity to
seek an evaluation and ultimately treatment."'' 1
Remarking on the absence of New York precedent, the court
relied on authority from other states and held that the deceased had
no right to rely on an insurance company to protect his interests.102
The court acknowledged that in the absence of a legal duty, there is
no breach, and without a breach, there is no liability. 10 3 The court
stated, "[t]he imposition of duty presents a question of law for the
courts ... resting on policy considerations of whether plaintiff's in-
terests are entitled to legal protection against defendant's con-
duct. ' 10 4 The court then noted that the law generally requires an
affirmative misrepresentation before imposing liability.105 The
court concluded that the relationship of the parties did not give the
deceased a right to rely upon the insurance company for medical
information, since the examination was conducted solely for the
purpose of determining the deceased's insurability. 10 6 In support of
its holding, the court relied solely on Jackson and Prudential.0 7
Contrariwise, in Meinze v. Holmes,108 the court imposed a duty
on an insurer to disclose any adverse medical findings resulting
from an examination. 10 9 Meinze applied for disability benefits,
which required medical examinations.I 10 Both physicians who ex-
amined Meinze acknowledged that he suffered from hypertension,
was at considerable risk for developing a myocardial infarction, and
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 285.
103 Id. (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 342 (1928)).
104 Id. at 285.
105 Id. But see PROSSER, TORTS § 33 at 179 (4 th ed. 1941) ("[A] failure to
disclose the existence of a known danger may be the equivalent of a misrepresen-
tation, where it is expected that the other will rely upon the appearance of
safety."); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 232-233
(1956) (examinee should be entitled to rely "on the expectation that he would be
told of any dangerous condition actually disclosed by that examination.").
106 695 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
107 695 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
108 532 N.E.2d 170 (1987).
109 532 N.E.2d at 174.
110 Id. at 171.
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should significantly restrict his physical activities.111 The insurance
company, however, did not inform Meinze of these results.
112
Meinze died after suffering a fatal heart attack, which may have
been prevented with timely treatment.11 3 The Meinze court found
that the duty of care arises from an extension of the duty of an
examining physician who has assumed a professional position with
respect to the examinee's medical condition.1 14 Distinguishing
Meinze, the Petrosky court concluded that Meinze was not control-
ling because, unlike in Meinze, there was no examining physician
upon whom to impose a duty.
11 5
Jackson, Prudential, LoDico, and Petrosky provide that the de-
finitive factor in deciding whether to impose liability is the determi-
nation of whether or not a doctor-patient relationship existed.11 6
As such, if the courts had applied this principle consistently, each
plaintiff would have been entitled to recovery, or at minimum, a
legal duty would have been imposed on the insurance company.11 7
The involvement of physicians is inherent in every life insurance
application process.1 18 Although the examination is conducted by a
paramedical, a licensed physician is certainly interpreting the results
of every examination.11 9 Every life insurance company employs a
licensed physician whose duties as medical director include review-
111 Id.
112 Id. at 174.
113 Id. at 172.
114 532 N.E.2d at 174.
115 695 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
116 Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Miss. 1995),
affd, 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S. Ct. 956, 136 L.
Ed. 2d. 843 (1997) (holding that insurance company should not be held to same
standard as physicians); Jane Doe v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243 (D.
Md. 1995) (denying recovery based in part because physician employed by insur-
ance company had not assumed advisory role traditionally associated with profes-
sional expertise); LoDico v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361, 517 N.Y.S.2d 640 (4th Dept.
1987) (holding that when physician conducts examination solely for insurance
company, physician is not liable to examinee for failure to diagnose latent medical
condition); Petrosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281, 181 Misc. 2d 897 (1999), aff'd,
718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 729 A.D.2d 75 (1St Dep't 2001); appeal denied, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS
1045 (N.Y. May 3, 2001) (court found no examining physician on which to impose
a duty).
117 See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162.
118 MACLEAN, supra note 21, at 250-256.
119 Id.
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ing the report of every examination conducted on an applicant. 120
As this Note provides, it seems illogical to deny recovery for those
plaintiffs and those survived by the deceased simply because the
applicant and the physician did not have a personal encounter, even
though the physician undertakes the role of evaluating each individ-
ual's medical information in the same manner as any primary care
physician. This narrow interpretation neglects to take into consid-
eration the fact that a physician is diagnosing the condition of each
applicant; the absence of a physical examination should not detract
from a physician's ethical responsibility to exercise due care to
other persons. 121 The Prudential court never addressed the physi-
cian's participation. 122 Instead, the court hastily concluded, without
consideration, that the physician's purpose was to act solely for the
benefit of the insurance company and not to otherwise treat or ben-
efit the applicant. 12
3
Despite the existing precedent, the role that physicians play in
creating a duty of disclosure is unclear rather than solidified. 124
Even in cases where a physician, employed by a life insurance com-
pany, has direct involvement in the application process, courts
continue to deny recovery. 125 In Ervin v. American Guardian Life
Insurance Co.,' 26 plaintiff submitted to medical tests conducted by
company physicians, in accordance with American's underwriting
policies. 127 Within one month of these tests, Ervin died of a heart
attack. 128 Ervin's widow filed suit, claiming that the company phy-
sicians and the medical director who reviewed the reports failed to
report to Ervin that he suffered from cardiac abnormalities. 129 The
court found that American did not owe a duty to apprise Ervin of
120 See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162. See also MACLEAN supra note 21, at
357.
121 LoDico v. Caputi, 129 A.D.2d 361,364-365,517 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642-643 (4th
Dept. 1987) (Green, J., dissenting); see also Ranier v. Frieman, 294 N.J. Super. 182,
190, 682 A.2d 1220 (App. Div. 1996) (articulating that a physician's duty is "to
make a professionally reasonable and competent diagnosis" in the context of an
examination requested by a third-party entity).
122 See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162.
123 860 F. Supp at 252.
124 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162.
125 See Ervin v. American Guardian Life Ins. Co., 376 Pa. Super. 132, 545
A.2d 354 (1988).
126 545 A.2d 354 (1988).
127 545 A.2d at 355.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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any adverse medical findings-their only duty was to determine
whether Ervin was "an insurable risk."
130
III. PROPOSED EXTENSION OF DUTY OF CARE
A. Expansion of Duty of Disclosure
The courts have held that a duty of disclosure exists even when
a doctor acts primarily for the benefit of a third party, with excep-
tion only for life insurance companies.131 Several cases support the
proposition that employers must disclose the results of medical ex-
aminations to both prospective and actual employees.132 The dif-
ferences between an employee examinee and an insurance
applicant examinee are effectively indistinguishable. 133 Analogous
to the life insurance company, employers who require prospective
130 Id.
131 See 860 F. Supp. 243; 944 F. Supp. 488; 129 A.D.2d 361; 695 N.Y.S.2d 281;
376 Pa. Super. 132, 545 A.2d 354.
132 See O.H. Webster, Annotation, Master's Liability for Failure to Inform
Servant of Disease or Physical Condition Disclosed by Medical Examination, 69
A.L.R.2d 1213 (1995). For example, in Dornak v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d
168 (La. 1981), the court held that once an employer undertakes to give a prospec-
tive employee a pre-employment examination, the employee can rely on the ex-
pectation that he or she would be told of a dangerous condition actually disclosed
by the examination. See also McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 183 A.D.2d 563; 84
N.Y.S.2d 538 (t Dept. 1992) (duty imposed to pre-employment doctor who failed
to disclose to prospective employee that a malignant tumor infiltrated his left lung;
court elaborated by noting that the burden of placing a duty upon the employer to
disclose was "slight and promoted the public welfare"); Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d
291 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that "when an individual is required, as a condition of
future or continued employment, to submit to a medical examination, that exami-
nation creates a relationship between the ... physician and the examinee, at least
to the extent of the tests conducted"); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18
Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1959) (imposition of liability
because employer failed to inform employee that he had tuberculosis); Dornak v.
Lafayette, 399 So. 2d 168, 170-171 (La. 1961) (hospital owed prospective employee
a duty to disclose tubercular condition which it discovered during pre-employment
examination); James v. United States, 483 F. Supp 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (prospec-
tive employer failed to inform applicant that he had a carcinoma located in the
lung and mediastinum); Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366 (Cal.
1972) (prospective employee lost valuable treatment time because he was unaware
that he had bone marrow cancer).
133 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 159-160. The Supreme Court of New York
has held that a duty of disclosure exists when a prospective employer learns
through a pre-employment physical of a job applicant's potentially life-threatening
condition. See 183 A.D.2d 563, 84 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Justice Saxe "see[s] no reason to
arrive at a different conclusion where a prospective insurer learns of a potentially
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and actual employees to submit to medical examinations are acting
in their own interest.134 Both use the exam results to assess an indi-
vidual's suitability, whether for employment or insurability pur-
poses.135 Employers use test results to exclude applicants from
jobs, much like insurance companies consider the exam results to
exclude life insurance applicants. 136 Clearly, no significant differ-
ences exist between the life insurance applicant and the employee
or prospective employee. 137 Unfortunately, the rights granted to
employees are not extended to insurance applicants, despite being
in apparently "comparable positions."'1 38 The reasons for this in-
congruity are uncertain. Life insurance companies should be held
to the same reasonable standard of care as employers.
139
life-threatening condition through a physical examination of a prospective in-
sured."); Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 344 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
134 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 159-160.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 159-160. "No valid distinction can be made
between a prospective employer and prospective insurer who know of test results
indicating the presence of a potentially life-threatening medical condition in an
application, whether it be for a job or for an insurance policy." See also Petrosky,
718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 346 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
138 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 161.
139 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 159-160. McKinney reflects an entirely differ-
ent basis for imposition of a duty on employers, distinct from the duty of an exam-
ining physician:
The failure to inform an employee or prospective employee that his
pre-employment physical has detected a serious medical condition
is an act of ordinary negligence with the experience of a trier of
fact. That... silence of the employer induced reliance by the plain-
tiff of his general good health an resulted in the failure to seek
treatment, to his obvious detriment, may be inferred. .... The ten-
dency of the average person, in similar circumstances, to interpret the
employer's silence as an indication of good health is so apparent and
the consequence of such reliance so potentially serious that we con-
clude that the law imposes a duty to disclose upon the employer. In
comparison with the harm to be abated, the burden placed upon the
employer is slight and promotes the public welfare [emphasis ad-
ded]. 183 A.D.2d at 565-566.
The foregoing quote demonstrates that the duty discussed in McKinney was not
intended as an extension of the responsibilities of a physician hired by a third party
(in McKinney, an employer), but was rather based on the recognition a job appli-
cant would assume that he would be informed by the employer if any test results
indicated the presence of an adverse medical condition. Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d
340, 345-346 (J. Saxe, dissenting). "Nothing in the discussion in McKinney sup-
ports the conclusion reached in Doe v. Prudential that imposition of a duty is only
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Perhaps the injudicious outcome in nondisclosure cases is due
to the fact that courts engage in a misguided analysis by focusing on
the presence or absence of a traditional physician-patient relation-
ship.140 Courts adhering to this rule embrace the traditional medi-
cal malpractice model, -holding the insurance company and the
underwriter immune from liability due to the non-existence of the
classic physician-patient relationship. The operative question
should be, whether the life insurance company, having discovered
the presence of an adverse medical condition based on the physi-
cian's findings, is under a duty to disclose the condition to the appli-
cant.' 4 ' This Note acknowledges that no doctor-patient
relationship exists between the applicant and the insurance com-
pany or the underwriter, but suggests imposition of a duty to act
with reasonable care based on common-law negligence princi-
ples.142 When the insurance company fails to disclose the existence
of an illness in a timely fashion, as a result the applicant suffers a
appropriate where the physical examination was conducted by a physician, thereby
,assuming a professional and expert position with respect to the insured's physical
condition and well-being.'" Id. at 346. The absence of a special relationship be-
tween the parties should not be dispositive; even if a special relationship can be
said to exist between employer and employee, McKinney applied its reasoning to
both employees and prospective employees, "and no special relationship can be
said to exist between a prospective employer and a mere job applicant." Id. The
situation between an employee and a prospective employee, and an insurer and
prospective insured are analogous-McKinney addressed the issue of the danger
to the public at large, and that reasoning should be extended to life insurance dis-
closure cases. Interview with Stephen Beldock, Attorney for Barbara Petrosky
with Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank (March 26, 2001).
140 See, e.g., Lodico, 129 A.D.2d 361 (holding that absence of physician-pa-
tient relationship prevents plaintiff from recovering from examining physician for
failure to diagnose brain tumor during disability examination); Ervin, 545 A.2d 354
(holding surgeon not liable for failure to diagnose and disclose cardiac disease pur-
suant to insurance exam because physician-patient relationship absent).
141 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 154-155
142 New Jersey, for example, has long recognized that a physician owes a duty
of reasonable care in the context of a third-party examination. See Neil J. Squil-
lante, Expanding the Potential Tort Liability of Physicians: A Legal Portrait of
"Nontraditional Patients" and Proposals for Change, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1617. See
also Reed v. Bojarski, 166 N.J. 89, 764 A.2d 433 (2001) (holding that the substan-
tive content of reasonable care in the third-party situation is dependent upon rele-
vant negligence principles applied with appropriate public policy concerns; the
existence of a traditional doctor-patient relationship is therefore not necessary in
order to find the existence of a duty). See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7 (sug-
gesting that courts reject the traditional medical malpractice model).
2001] DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION 69
reduced chance of survival or optimal recovery. 143 The courts' mis-
takenly indulge in a presumption that imposes no liability arising
from medical tests not performed for physician-patient diagnostic
purposes.
Since the life insurance company has assumed the act of evalu-
ating their applicant's health status, it must be compelled to act with
care. 144 "[A] failure to disclose the existence of a known danger
may be the equivalent of a misrepresentation, where it is expected
that the other will rely upon the appearance of safety. '145 Through-
out the law of torts, the causal connection between the wrongful
conduct and the resulting damage embraces misrepresentation in
the form of inducement of the plaintiff to act, or to refrain from
acting to his detriment. 146 If the insurance companies in Prudential,
Jackson, LoDico, Ervin, and Petrosky made appropriate disclo-
sures, the applicant's probability of escaping some of the adverse
effects would have likely increased. Although the applicant is in
complete control of his or her physical health, the life insurance
company, nonetheless, has, in its exclusive possession, critical life-
determinative information 47 which, under New York law, it is
under no legal obligation to disclose.
48
Arguably, applicants that have been rejected should be on no-
tice that medical assistance should be sought. 149 Regardless, life in-
surance companies exclusively possess information that may save,
prolong, or increase the applicant's quality of life.150 Many individ-
uals, to their detriment, rely on silence as an indication of general
good health. 151 Authority exists which provides that silence can
mislead an examinee.1 52 An examinee generally assumes that "'no
143 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 154-155.
144 Hoover v. Williamson, 203 A.2d 863 (1964); Meinze v. Holmes, 532 N.E.2d
1, 173; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (A) (2000).
145 PROSSER, TORTS § 33 at 179 (4' ed. 1941).
146 PROSSER, TORTS § 108, at 714 (4th ed. 1941).
147 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151.
148 See supra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
149 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151.
150 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151. See also Peace v. Weisman, 186 Ga. App.
697, 368 S.E.2d 319 (1988), where the dissent noted that "the only one left unin-
formed is the one most affected by the information."
151 McKinney, 183 A.D.2d at 566.
152 Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (1974) (reaffirming Hoover and
extending it to apply to physician's inaction, which, in the court's opinion, is com-
parable to express misrepresentation). See also Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Stapelton, 237 F.2d 229 (1956) (holding that by remaining silent, respondent per-
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news is good news and relies on the assumption that any serious
condition [would have been revealed]."'1 53 The rationale behind
such a duty to disclose is that once an insurance company elects to
provide a health examination, the examinee should be entitled to
rely "on the expectation that he would be told of any dangerous
condition actually disclosed by that examination. ' 154 In an effort to
prevent unwarranted assumptions of good health, it would there-
fore be appropriate for the law to provide that nondisclosure is tan-
tamount to misrepresentation. 155
Even those who suspect the existence of an adverse medical
condition may resist obtaining test results to avoid confronting the
possibility of unfavorable results. Moreover, some individuals may
lack the ability to make an informed decision regarding their health
due to external factors, much like Jane Doe, who neglected to fol-
low through on obtaining her test results for fear that she would
lose her child.156 Since the consequences of such reliance by the
applicant are potentially serious, at a minimum, a definite legal
standard imposing a duty on the insurance company to disclose di-
agnostic conclusions should be adopted. 157
Additionally, imposing liability on the medical director, as well
as on the insurance company, for failing to disclose findings about
serious health dangers may be appropriate. While it is well-settled
that a physician-patient relationship is an essential element of a
cause of action based on medical malpractice, an action based on
simple negligence does not require such a relationship. 158 The
mitted movant to rely upon a tacit assurance of safety despite its knowledge of the
existence of a hidden health danger); Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467-1470 (9 th
Cir. 1991) (remarking generally that an examinee reasonably may rely on a medi-
cal expert to warn of a known but hidden health danger).
153 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 232-233 (1956),
cited approvingly, Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 464 F. 2d 772
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064, 34 L. Ed. 2d 518, 93 S. Ct. 560 (1972).
154 237 F.2d 229. See also Daly v. United States, 946 F.2d 1467-1470 (9 th Cir.
1991) (noting that the duty to disclose is not burdensome, and recognizes that ex-
aminees ".... justifiably [have] the reasonable expectation that [a medical expert]
will warn [the examinee] of any incidental dangers of which he is cognizant ... ").
155 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7 (insisting that hindering the facili-
tation of timely medical treatment offends the preservation of life).
156 860 F. Supp at 247.
157 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7.
158 See Reed v. Life Care Inst., Inc, 166 N.J. 89, 764 A.2d 433 (2001) (despite
absence of traditional doctor-patient relationship, under ordinary rules of negli-
gence, defendant physician had a nondelegable duty to conduct a reasonable, com-
2001] DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION 71
courts apply the narrow test of imposing liability only to treating or
examining physicians. 159 Such an interpretation is too restrictive
and fails to consider the realities of the relationship that arises,
however briefly, when a physician is exercising his or her profes-
sional skills in diagnosing another person. 60 Even though a physi-
cian's services, which include diagnosing, are rendered at the
request of a third party, the physician's duty to care for another
person is not eliminated or diminished.161 A physician's duty ex-
tends not only to provide proper treatment, but to also make an
accurate diagnosis upon which treatment will be based. 162 Impos-
ing liability on the life insurance provider is certainly appropriate
since the harm to the applicant proximately results from the physi-
cian's acts within the scope of his employment with the insurance
company.
63
petent examination, and this necessarily included making critical information
available to an examinee); McKinney v. Bellevue Hosp., 584 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992) (holding that doctors are liable for simple negligence in the ab-
sence of a physician-patient relationship); Hale v. State of New York 53 A.D.2d
1025 (1976); Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp. & Dispensary, 284 N.Y. 176 (1940);
Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hosp., 239 N.Y. 188 (1924). See also Morwin v. Albany
Hosp., 7 A.D.2d 582, amended, 8 A.D.2d 911 (1959). Liability in life insurance
disclosure cases should be predicated on a negligence theory, not the traditional
medical malpractice model. Interview with Stephen Beldock, Attorney for Bar-
bara Petrosky with Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank (March 26, 2001).
159 LoDico, 129 A.D.2d 361 (Green, J., dissenting).
160 See id.; Twitchell v. MacKay, 78 A.D.2d 125, 128 (1980) (rejecting narrow
approach). See also Northon v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 731, 89 S.E.2d 809
(1955) ("Negligent failure to attend and treat [an individual] at a time when the
need of treatment is known to [a] physician and there is opportunity to apply
proper treatment amounts to the same as negligent treatment .. "); Reed, 166
N.J. 89 (providing that the exact nature of the relationship is only a factor to be
considered.) The Reed court held that a physician is expected to exercise reasona-
ble care commensurate with his experience and training, which involves communi-
cating results to an examinee. The court further held that any reasonable person
would expect to be notified of a serious illness if it is discovered.
161 See Dubois v. Decker, 130 N.Y. 325 (1891) (no defense that no contractual
or employment relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant); LoDico, 129
A.D.2d at 364.
162 See Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209 (1898) (noting that physician is
under obligation to use his best judgment in exercising his skill and applying his
knowledge); LoDico, 129 A.D.2d at 364.
163 Though a physician is bound independently by the ethical code of the
medical profession, the life insurance medical director is an employee of the com-
pany since the insurance company exercises control over the administrative aspects
of the director's work life. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 223, cmt. a
(physicians can be employees if the factors suggest an employment relationship).
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B. Expansion of Disclosure of Medical Conditions
In addition to the HIV virus, the insurance applicant can pos-
sess serious adverse medical conditions which pose equally detri-
mental risks to the individual if left untreated. 164 Such conditions
include heart disease, various forms of cancer, and impaired liver
and kidney functions. 165 The existence of transmittable illnesses
such as tuberculosis and hepatitis also expose third parties to
harm.' 66 Mandatory disclosure legislation applied to one particular
medical condition is insufficient to protect the health interests of
the insurance applicant and the populace. 67 Expansion of disclo-
sure legislation should encompass all adverse medical conditions.
IV. HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH
NONMANDATORY DISCLOSURE
A. Loss of Treatment Time
A life insurance company's failure to inform an applicant that
he or she is suffering from a condition that requires medical atten-
tion results in loss of critical treatment time. 68 For example, the
See also Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 157 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1945) (noting that
even though the corporation employed a physician primarily to protect its inter-
ests, the court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold the corporation
accountable; the court concluded that even when an employer hires a physician
solely for the employer's benefit, the employer is liable for any injury causation
sustained through the physician acting as the employer's agent.); Mracheck v. Sun-
shine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801 (1954) (holding that physician
employed solely for company's benefit is a servant); Betesh v. United States, 400 F.
Supp. 238 (1974) (finding that the physician was the employer's agent, and thus,
the employer was liable for the failure to disclose). But see Thomas v. Keeton, 425
So.2d 396 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that physicians who examine employees
wholly for the benefit of employers have no duty to disclose medical conditions);
Tomko v. Comprehensive Imaging, Inc., 412 Pa. Super. 54 (1.992) (no duty of care
arose when defendant physician allegedly misread X-ray in the course of a pre-
employment examination).
164 See, e.g., Petrosky, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281 (applicant unsuspectingly suffered
from severe and extensive atherosclerotic disease); supra notes 93-107 and accom-
panying text.
165 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 162 (delineating health conditions that could
potentially effect applicant's mortality).
166 For a comprehensive discussion on these conditions, see infra notes 189-
208 and accompanying text.
167 See infra notes 168-188 and accompanying text.
168 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 148-149.
2001] DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION 73
lab results of a life insurance examination can reveal cancer. 169
Blood counts may reveal the existence of a cellular malignancy.
170
A positive prognosis results only from timely oncologic treat-
ment. 171 Many forms of cancer are curable in their early stages with
surgery alone.172 Radiation and drug therapy also play a key role in
the cure of early stage cancers.' 73 Delay in treatment is the most
prevalent poor prognostic factor.'
74
Diabetes Mellitus is a syndrome caused by an insulin supply
and demand imbalance. 75 It is characterized by elevated blood
sugar and associated with abnormal carbohydrate, fat, and protein
metabolism. 176 Immediate medical care is essential to ensure effec-
tiveness of treating the condition. 177 Complications of the illness
increase with late treatment. 178 Late clinical diagnosis can lead to
169 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 136.
170 THE MERCK MANUAL (1 6th ed. 1995) at 1273 [hereinafter, MERCK MAN-
UAL]. Some of the more routine tests such as the Complete Blood Count (CBC)
Differential do not test for specific types of cancer, but indicate the presence of an
abnormality. See generally JOYCE M. BLACK & ESTER MATASSARIN-JACOBS,
CLINICAL MANAGEMENT FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, at 556 (5th ed. 1997) [herein-
after, CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE].
171 See generally MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, Chapter 103-Oncology.
172 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 1276. The five-year survival rates for
cancer cured by surgery alone include: cervix (94%), breast (82%), bladder
(81%), colon (81%), prostate (80%), larynx (76%), endometirum (74%), ovary
(72%), oral cavity (67-76%), kidney (67%), testis (65%), and lung (non-small cell,
stage 1) (50-70%). Id.
173 Id. at 1276-1281. Forms of cancer which respond particularly well to radia-
tion, if detected early, are Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, Hodgkin's Disease, and
Prostate cancer. The five year disease-free rate for these forms of cancer treated
by radiation therapy are 90%, 88%, and 84%, respectively. Drug therapy is highly
effective for curing malignancies in its early stages of Hodgkin's Disease (74% 5
yr. disease-free rate), testicular cancer (88% 5 yr. disease-free rate), and chorio-
carcinoma (all stages, 95% 5 yr. disease-free rate). Id. at 1286.
174 See id. at 1275.
175 See generally id., Ch. 91-Disorders of Carbohydrate Metabolism;
CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1955.
176 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1955.
177 See generally, MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, Chapter 91-Disorders of
Carbohydrate Metabolism. Treatment regimens effective in keeping glucose fluc-
tuations normal include plasma-glucose monitoring, insulin treatment, and diet
management. See also CLINICAL MGT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170,
at 1965, 1968-1970.
178 CLINICAL MGT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1109-1125.
When the condition is undiagnosed, diabetes is the third leading cause of death
from disease in the United States. Even when it is not fatal, diabetes can cause
major disabilities. In the United States, diabetes mellitus is the single greatest con-
tributor to blindness in adults, end-stage renal failure, and nontraumatic amputa-
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the development of specific forms of renal, ocular, neurologic, and
cardiovascular complications. 179
The most effective method to prevent impaired cardiac func-
tion is reduction of primary risk factors.180 Prognosis is poor unless
the individual is subjected to aggressive reduction of cholesterol
levels through dietary and exercise treatment, supplemented with
medication as necessary.' 8' Individuals afflicted with certain cardio-
vascular disorders may not experience symptoms particular to the
disease. 182 In this situation, the insurance company possesses exclu-
sive control over information that may save the life of the applicant.
Failure to impose a duty to apprise the applicant that he or she is at
risk for development or exacerbation of a cardiac disorder, particu-
larly those that are characteristically silent, is intolerable.
The screening procedure also tests the cholesterol levels of the
applicant.'8 3 Abnormally high lipid levels can lead to the develop-
ment of coronary heart disease and metabolic diseases of the liver,
if not timely reduced to normal values. 84 With lowered choles-
terol, an individual drastically decreases the probability of develop-
tions; it is also a risk factor in coronary artery disease and stroke. See CLINICAL
MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1955.
179 Late clinical complications that can result from untimely treatment in-
clude kidney damage, sensory defects, skin tissue deterioration, debilitating pain,
and vision damage which can lead to blindness. See CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CON-
TINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170 at 1992-2000.
180 See generally, MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 411 (reversible risk fac-
tors include hypercholesterolemia, hypertension, cigarette smoking, obesity, and
physical inactivity).
181 Id. at 412. Continued treatment with Digoxin reduces the risk of develop-
ing worsening cardiac disorders when administered early in the course of the ill-
ness, as evidenced by reduced heart failure-related hospitalizations, instances of
emergency care, and the need for concomitant cardiac therapy. In a double-blind
placebo-controlled study of 6,801 patients, Digoxin was associated with a 25% re-
duction in the number of hospitalizations for heart failure, a 28% reduction in the
risk of a patient having at least one hospitalization for heart failure, and a 6.5%
reduction in total hospitalizations. This trend was evident in subgroups of patients
with mild heart conditions as well as more severe diseases. See PHYSICIAN'S DESK
REFERENCE, at 1153 (1999).
182 Coronary heart disease, hypertension, congestive heart failure, pulmonary
edema, pericarditis, dysrythmias, tachycardia, and artherosclerosis are among the
cardiac conditions that can develop in the absence of symptoms. See CLINICAL
MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170 at 411, 417, 451, 488, 501, 521,
and 563.
183 See Middleton, supra, note 24.
184 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1220,
1895.
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ing one of these medical conditions. 185 Again, the individual who
has elevated cholesterol levels may be asymptomatic, 186 and may
therefore delay receiving necessary treatment.
Although New York currently imposes a duty on the prospec-
tive insurer to inform an applicant that he or she is infected with the
HIV virus, before 1990,187 applicants infected with the virus lost
valuable treatment time. The health status of insurance applicants
unsuspectingly afflicted with the disease in the twenty-eight other
states that have refused to impose such a duty is currently deterio-
rating. Studies have shown that early medication/medicinal therapy
can delay the course of the virus and improve quality of life.188 In-
disputably, the dangers inherent in delaying treatment time can no
longer be ignored.
B. Health Risks to Others
Currently, third parties in other jurisdictions are unknowingly
being exposed to the HIV virus due to the life insurance company's
failure to disclose an applicant's infected status. 189 Although New
York has appropriately reduced the spread of the HIV virus
through mandatory disclosure legislation, the failure to disclose an
applicant's medical condition can result in additional health risks to
third parties.
185 Id. at 1241 (noting that reduction of fatty acids, increased physical activity,
and medication monitoring have proven extremely successful in preventing choles-
terol-induced disorders).
186 Id. at 1241 (remarking that atherosclerosis is typically well advanced when
clinical manifestations develop). Often, manifestations of coronary heart disease
do not appear until the coronary artery is narrowed by 75%. Id. at 1244.
187 In response to the growing prevalence of AIDS, NY Ins. L. § 2611 was
enacted in 1990 in an effort to protect the rights of those infected. See KAMEN &
TOPPE-rA, supra note 22; Doe v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 944 F. Supp. at 491
(Frank Deramus learned he was HIV positive eighteen months after the insurance
company discovered the condition).
188 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 83. Zidovudine (ZDU) has increased
the median survival rate severalfold.
189 Frank Deramus continually put his wife at risk while the couple attempted
to conceive a child. See Greenwald, supra note 7 (telephone interview with Jody
Deramus, wife of Frank Deramus (November 15, 1996)). See also 860 F. Supp 243.
Jane Doe's husband contracted the virus through unprotected sexual intercourse.
In addition, her baby was exposed to the virus each time she nursed. Jane's hus-
band has since tested positive for the virus.
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The life insurance exam may include screenings for tuberculo-
sis and hepatitis. 190 Prompt use of effective antituberculous medi-
cation is the most effective means of limiting transmission.1 91
Infection is virtually almost airborne, 192 and thus, is communicable
at an alarmingly high rate. 193 Although the course of the illness
varies among individuals, individuals infected with the bacterial vi-
rus will likely suffer from persistent cough, fever, compromised im-
mune system, and unresolved pneumonia. 194 Once infection is
established, clinical tuberculosis may develop within months, or it
may be delayed for years. 95 Tuberculosis may be fatal if not
treated appropriately.
196
Simply stated, hepatitis is an inflammation of the liver.1 97 The
presence of antibodies in the blood denotes (1) previous or resolv-
ing infection, (2) a continuing chronic infection, or (3) immuniza-
tion from hepatitis vaccine.' 98 Transmission of hepatitis can occur
through person-to-person contact. 199 The virus has a high infectiv-
ity rate.200 Symptoms of viral hepatitis include flu-like illness, jaun-
dice, malaise, and liver failure.201 Hepatitis, when left untreated,
often results in the development of chronic active hepatitis, often
leading to destruction of the liver.20 2 Aplastic anemia is a further
complication of acute viral hepatitis with a high mortality rate.
20 3
Currently, no treatment exists to reverse the condition.20 4 Individu-
190 Middleton, supra note 24; Greenwald, supra note 7 at 136.
191 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 131; CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CON-
TINUITY OF CARE, supra note 159 at 1143.
192 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1140
(describing how, in nearly all instances, infection is acquired by inhalation by a
receptive host).
193 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 131.
194 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1141,
1142.
195 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 131.
196 Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress, The Continu-
ing Challenge of Tuberculosis (1993).
197 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1861.
198 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1865.
199 Spread of the virus occurs through contact with blood and bodily fluids.
MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 900-901.
200 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 900-901.
201 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 170, at 902.
202 CLINICAL MGMT. FOR CONTINUITY OF CARE, supra note 170, at 1865.
Hepatitis B develops into chronic hepatitis if left untreated in 1 in 10 persons. Id.
at 1865.
203 Id. at 1869.
204 Id.
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als who are otherwise healthy usually recover from Hepatitis A.20 5
However, in the absence of treatment Hepatitis A may develop into
fulminant hepatitis, which resembles acute liver failure. 206 Fulmi-
nant hepatitis causes severe illness and even death. 20 7 Given the
serious health risks that tuberculosis and hepatitis poses to third
parties, an insurance company should be mandated to inform the
local board of health in an effort to advance infection control.208
V. LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ENACTING STATE
DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION
A. Risk Utility Formula
The tort of negligence imposes a legal duty to act as a reasona-
ble person, guided by ordinary considerations which ordinarily reg-
ulate human affairs. 20 9 Conduct that falls below this standard for
the protection against others against unreasonable risk or harm re-
sults in liability.210 The reasonable person, Justice Learned Hand
postulates, takes a precaution against injury if the burden in doing
so is less than the loss if the injury occurs multiplied by the
probability that the injury will occur.211 The formula is suggestive
of the appropriate balancing process one should employ when en-
gaging in risk-creating conduct.212 This risk-utility formula gives
significance and meaning to the concept of "reasonableness" into a
205 Id.
206 Id. at 1865.
207 The fulminant hepatitis mortality rate is 90-100%. See id. at 1867
208 Five states, including New York, have over half of the new tuberculosis
cases. See Reynolds v. Goord, 103 F. Supp. 2d 316 (2000). In response to the
highly infectious nature of the disease, public health departments have regulations
that may be enforced in the event of nonadherence to treatment. In March 1993,
New York enacted legislation empowering the city health commissioner to detain
those infected with tuberculosis who failed to follow an appropriate course of
treatment. See New York City Health Code, 24 RCNY § 11.47 (1993). See also
Karen H. Rothenberg & Elizabeth C. Lovoy, Something Old, Something New: The
Challenge of Tuberculosis Control in the Age of AIDS, 42 BUFF. L. REV. at 744
(1994). For a discussion regarding the resurgence of the tuberculosis epidemic in
New York City, see generally, Carlos A. Ball & Mark Barnes, Public Health and
Individual Rights: Tuberculosis Control and Detention Procedures in New York
City, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 38 (1994).
209 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6 t ed. 1990).
210 Id.
211 See R. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
212 Id.
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framework which, "if followed will bring about the .. .efficient,
cost-justified level of accidents and safety.
'213
Application of this formula, balancing the relevant facts of the
cases previously discussed, convincingly suggests that life insurance
companies should inform their applicants of the results of their
medical examinations. 214 According to this theory, to determine
whether an individual owes a duty to another, the interplay of three
factors must be considered: (1) the probability that harm will occur
if no precautions are taken, (2) the magnitude of the injury if the
harm occurs, and (3) the burden of taking precautions that would
prevent the accident. 21 5 "If the probability be called, P; the injury,
L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than
L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL. ''216
If the variables are contextualized, it becomes obvious that in-
surance disclosure legislation is most cost-justified. 217 The likeli-
hood that exacerbation of illness or death of the ailing applicant
will occur (P) is very high, as the individual who is unaware of an
adverse medical condition will remedy the illness with inatten-
tion. 21 8 The resulting injuries (L) are among the greatest magni-
tude, since aggravation of medical conditions, the possible
infections of third parties, or death could result.219 Lastly, the bur-
den (B) on the life insurance company is comparatively insignifi-
cant;220 it would mandate only the issuance of a letter apprising the
applicant of any troubling findings. 22' Since twenty-eight states
have enacted statutes to this effect, disclosure is clearly not dispro-
213 Id.
214 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151-153.
215 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
216 Id. at 173.
217 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153.
218 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151-153.
219 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151-153.
220 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 151-153; infra notes 256-271 and accompany-
ing text. See also, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents University of California, 551 P.2d 334,
342 (Cal. 1976) (enunciating the rule that where a psychiatrist determines that a
warning is essential to avert danger arising from the psychological condition of his
patient, he or she incurs a legal obligation to warn). The basis for this decision was
the court's belief that we live in an "interdependent" and "risk-infected" society,
and members of such a society cannot tolerate exposure to additional risks that
could be averted by a simple act of communication. Id. at 347.
221 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152 (suggesting similar solution for federal
insurance disclosure legislation).
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portionately burdensome. 222 Because of the significant risks that a
policy of nondisclosure presents to the applicant, coupled with the
minor burden mandatory disclosure imposes on the life insurance
company, a legal duty to make appropriate disclosures should be
obligatory.2
23
B. Policy Considerations in Favor of Finding a Duty of Care
The case law presented in this Note briefly referenced impor-
tant considerations of policy. The Prudential court stated that the
"duty element in a negligence action is merely 'an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.' 224 Such policy consider-
ations that courts recognize are the foreseeability of harm, the con-
nection between the offending party's conduct and the injury
suffered, moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the ex-
tent of the burden to the offender, and the consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liabil-
ity for breach.2 25 Despite recognizing these policy considerations,
the courts have presumptively concluded that a duty of disclosure
did not exist without adequately considering the intermingling of
these factors.226 As previously discussed, the foreseeability and
likelihood that an individual suffering from a latent medical condi-
tion will not procure medical attention to prevent further worsening
of the condition or take the necessary precautions in an effort to
222 The twenty-eight states which currently require insurance company disclo-
sure are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, New York (only HIV results), North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. See Greenwald, supra note 7, at 132.
223 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
224 860 F. Supp. 243, 251 (quoting Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527,
515 A.2d 756 (1986) quoting, PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 53 at 358
(5th ed. 1984)).
225 See 860 F. Supp. at 251 (quoting Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. United
States Gypsum Co., 556 A.2d 1126 (1989) in which the court quoted Tarasoff v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal.); 944 F. Supp. 488, 496. See generally Craddock v. Gross,
504 A.2d 1300 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("a question of whether a defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff, and in negligence cases, the
duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in
the light of the apparent risk.").
226 See Greenwald, supra note 7.
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reduce the infectivity to third parties is significantly high.227 The
insurance company's failure to disclose is inseparable from the
harm suffered by the applicant. 228 The resultant injury should not
refer to the initial contraction or development of the medical condi-
tion, but rather the deterioration of the applicant's medical condi-
tion and the failure to safeguard third parties from contagions.
229
Undoubtedly, a connection exists between the aggravated health
condition of the individual and nondisclosure by the insurance com-
pany.230 Additionally, mandatory disclosure legislation benefits the
community. 231 Such benefits include the facilitation of timely medi-
cal treatment for sick individuals, the protection of healthy individ-
uals from infection, and the attainment of an interest in one's
personal medical information.232 The benefits of the community
clearly outweigh any insignificant burden placed on the life insur-
ance company.
233
VI. RECOMMENDATION: MANDATED NEW YORK
STATUTORY LEGISLATION
A. Elements of a State Statute Regulating Insurance Disclosure
To ensure that an individual's interest in their medical informa-
tion is fully realized, mandatory life insurance disclosure legislation
must be adopted. While New York mandates HIV test disclosure,
state residents who suffer from non-HIV medical conditions must
also be afforded protection.234 If such legislation were enacted, the
227 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153-154.
228 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153-154.
229 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153-154.
230 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 154-155.
231 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 155.
232 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 155.
233 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 155.
234 See, e.g., Petrosky, 695 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Saxe, J., dissenting, noting that there
is no reason to infer that the legislature intended that a duty of disclosure should
not extend upon insurers to disclose any other type of test result. Rather, in enact-
ing 28 NY Ins. L. § 2611(c), "the Legislature was merely focusing its attention on
the ongoing effort toward preventing the spread of a contagious, deadly illness,
which effort requires large-scale, society-wide actions. It did not preclude the
courts from imposing a similar duty in other types of circumstances."); 718
N.Y.S.2d 340, 347. The model statute proposed in the APPENDIX is broad enough
to include all adverse medical conditions. New Jersey has also imposed a narrow,
limited duty on insurance companies to make disclosures. N.J.A.A. 17:23A-13.1
compels a life insurance company to disclose any communicable diseases discov-
ered during an examination. This statute fails to protect those applicants who suf-
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unfortunate result in Petrosky, and in similar cases, could have been
avoided.
Currently, Congress is considering insurance disclosure legisla-
tion that will regulate the manner in which insurance companies
present potentially life-saving information.235 However, nothing
prevents New York State from enacting its own state regulation
policies without delay.236 In essence, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
gives supremacy to state regulation of the business of insurance.237
Appended to this Note is a proposed model insurance disclo-
sure statute.238 The statute was drafted in an attempt to address the
critical issues raised, and to minimize the ambiguity confronted by
the courts in their attempt to determine the extent of the insurer's
duty. In general, the proposed legislation should require that the
results of the medical examination be communicated to the appli-
cant, or to a designee. 239 The proposed legislation should also per-
mit insurance applicants to obtain their medical information
regardless of whether they have been denied coverage or offered
coverage at a higher premium. 240 Furthermore, the applicant
fer from uncommunicable medical conditions. See Nolan, 784 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super.
2001) (In this case, the life insurance applicant unknowingly possessed liver cancer
at the time of examination. Though the test results indicated elevated levels of two
liver enzymes, First Colony did not disclose the results of the blood test-the ap-
plicant died two years later.).
235 Congress has the authority to enact such insurance disclosure legislation.
In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson-Act (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994)).
236 In Section 1011 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress stated the un-
derlying policy of the statute as one favoring state regulation of insurance:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxa-
tion by the several States of the business of insurance is in the pub-
lic interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several States.
237 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. For a discussion of the statute, its history, and its
interpretation, see Linda M. Lent, McCarran-Ferguson in Perspective, 48 INS.
COUNSEL J. 411 (1981).
238 See APPENDIX. The proposed statute was modeled after the Medical Pri-
vacy in the Age of New Technologies Act (H.R. 1815, 105t' Cong. 2) and Section
2611 of the New York Insurance Law.
239 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 153 (asserting that because of the relatively
minor burden disclosure imposes and the significant risks to life that a policy of
nondisclosure represents, insurance companies should have a legal duty to
disclose).
240 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7 (arguing vigorously that critical
medical information must reach the concerned applicant in all circumstances); Pe-
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should be entitled to this information even if approved for cover-
age.2 41 In the event the life insurance company discloses the exis-
tence of an unfavorable medical condition, the company should
inform the individual of the location of local medical facilities and
provide references to suitable professionals.
242
The proposal should also provide the applicant with remedies
in the event his or her rights are violated.243 The statute should
prescribe civil sanctions for persons who have failed to comply with
the statute.2 44 The statute must ensure that an infringement on an
individual's rights will not be ignored or disregarded.
24 5
B. Imposition of Insurance Company Standard Practice to
Apprise Applicant of Possible Adverse
Medical Conditions
In comparison to the harm to be abated in favor of the appli-
cant, the burden placed upon the life insurance company is slight
and promotes the public welfare. 246 The insurance company can
simply include in their rejection letter that the medical tests indi-
trosky v. Brasner, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 283 (respondent insurance company offered
coverage at a higher premium without disclosing medical exam results).
241 See generally, Greenwald, supra note 7.
242 Some have urged that when an insurer is the source of an adverse test
result, the insurer should be responsible for suggesting counseling thereafter, since
this may be the first time the individual becomes aware of his or her medical sta-
tus. See Ralph C. Ferrara & L. Lance Cole, Marketing Financial Planning Services:
Overcoming the Regulatory Hurdles for Insurance Companies, 5 Journal of Ins.
Regulation 439-440 (1987).
243 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
244 In finding that "health information plays a vital role in every aspect of an
individual's life [and] includes some of the most sensitive information available
about an individual," the drafters of the Medical Privacy in the Age of New Tech-
nologies Act sought to provide individuals with access to their medical records.
H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. 2 (1997). The drafters of the Act remedied non-compli-
ance through civil sanctions. The Act prescribes civil sanctions for persons who
have "materially failed to comply with the provisions of the Act." H.R. 1815, 301.
If the violations occur with such frequency that they constitute a general business
practice, the Act increases the punishment. Id., 311.
245 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 167 (supporting the Medical Privacy in the
Age of New Technologies Act (HR 1815, 105 th Cong. 2 (1997)), which, like the
notification provision provided for in this Note, recognizes an individual's interest
in his or her own personal medical information).
246 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153. "Such a duty could be satisfied with
only a minimal effort, and does not impose an onerous burden on the insurance
industry." Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343 (Saxe, J., dissenting).
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cated that that applicant may be afflicted with a condition that re-
quires immediate attention.247 The letter should not state the
applicant's illness or medical condition; instead, the letter should
offer to release the results to a physician who can more appropri-
ately explain the significance of the test results.2 48 The letter should
also delineate a list of the tests performed, as well as an explanation
of the procedure by which the applicant could have the insurance
company disclose the results directly to his or her primary care phy-
sician.2 49 If the applicant does not respond, affirmative steps should
be taken by a representative of the insurance company to speak
personally with the applicant. Should the applicant persist in refus-
ing to have the information disclosed, it would be advantageous for
the insurance company to obtain a written release, if possible, to
establish that the insurance company has fulfilled its duty.
250
Insurance companies may oppose notifying the applicant of
any discovered medical conditions, contending that the insurance
company is not a doctor, and is therefore not expected to protect
life and limb.2 5 1 It is the position of the American Council for Life
Insurance that "it is not appropriate for insurance companies to de-
liver the bad news.1252 However, this Note is entirely consistent
with the notion that it would be unsuitable for the insurance com-
pany to espouse the role of physician. 253 The Meinze court specifi-
cally held that a duty to communicate can be satisfied by delivering
a written report to the applicant's treating physician.2 54 Thus,
247 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153; Nolan, 784 A.2d 81, 90 ("The Duty of
disclosure could be fully discharged by the simple expedient of sending all ... test
results to all policy applicants with a form letter suggesting that they should consult
their physicians regarding any [abnormalities.]").
248 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
249 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
250 The extent of the duty to disclose has been disputed, and is thus, uncer-
tain. See, e.g., 860 F. Supp. 243; 944 F. Supp. 488; 695 N.Y.S.2d 281.
251 See e.g., 944 F. Supp at 493. The court stated that such a heightened duty
of care and disclosure is required only from physicians who have "sworn to protect
and respect human life." Id. In addition the court remarked that "an insurance
company should [not] bear the same burden of care as a physician, i.e., divulging
the results of a medical examination." Id.
252 Telephone interview with Ginny Bueno, Spokeswoman for the American
Council of Life Insurance (June 23, 1997). Greenwald, supra, note 7, at 167.
253 Greenwald, supra, note 7, at 152-153, (acknowledging position of Ameri-
can Council of Life Insurance, but nevertheless advocating for disclosure). See
supra notes 258, 259 and accompanying text
254 40 Ohio App. 3d at 148.
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neither the potential insurer, nor the company's underwriter would
be compelled to personally inform the applicant of his or her medi-
cal status.2
55
A further perspective of the insurance company may be that
the burden of potential liability resulting from a negligent misdiag-
nosis would undermine the ability of insurance providers to utilize
such examinations to accept or reject an applicant.256 Physicians
employed by the insurance company would also likely find disclo-
sure disagreeable due to the possibility that misdiagnosis may stim-
ulate litigation.257 Nevertheless, the social utility of disclosure
outweighs the burden such potential liability would place on the
insurance company or the underwriter. 258 To lessen the burden of
potential liability on the insurance company, the proposed legisla-
tion could impose a lesser degree of liability of the insurer, requir-
ing gross negligence, not simple negligence, as an antecedent to an
actionable claim.2 5 9 An unmistakable public policy exists favoring
255 See supra notes 257-260 and accompanying text.
256 See, e.g., Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1998) (affirming similar
position in the context of auto insurance medical examinations). Stephen Beldock,
Attorney for Barbara Petrosky, suggests that the insurance company could avoid
such liability if they stated in their notification letter that they are solely providing
the information obtained from the medical examination, and would thus implore
the applicant to obtain a second opinion from his or her primary care physician.
Interview with Stephen Beldock, Attorney for Barbara Petrosky with Birbrower,
Montalbano, Condon & Frank (March 26, 2001).
257 See, e.g. Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 205 (Alaska 1995) (holding that
emotional distress resulting from a misdiagnosis of AIDS is foreseeable and ac-
tionable); Todd Neidlich, Suits by Patients Surge in Misdiagnosing AIDS Cases,
NAT'L L.J. at A12 (1995) (discussing recent cases involving the litigation of HIV
false-positive misdiagnosis and stating that "dozens of such suits are active around
the country"). No case to date has been found confronting the issue of a physi-
cian's duties and liabilities to a person examined pursuant to a life insurance con-
tract, but the Hoover court (see supra note 144, citing this case for the proposition
that the life insurance company must be compelled to act with care) has suggested
an analogy between such a case and a case involving pre-employment examination.
See J.P. Ludington, Physician's Duties and Liabilities to Person Examined Pursuant
to Physician's Contract with Such Person's Prospective or Actual Employer or In-
surer, 10 A.L.R.3d 1071 (2000).
258 See supra notes 209-233 and accompanying text.
259 As Prosser explains:
Most courts consider that gross negligence falls short of a reckless
disregard of the consequences, and differs from ordinary negli-
gence only in degree, and not in kind. There is, in short, not gener-
ally accepted meaning; but the probability is, when the phrase is
used, that it signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inatten-
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the preservation of life over the solvency of insurance companies.260
The balancing of the burdens and benefits of disclosure undoubt-
edly results in favoring the imposition of a duty to disclose on life
insurance companies.
261
VII. "THE CIVIL RIGHTS BATTLE OF THE NEXT CENTURY"' 2 6 2
As new advances in biomedical science are reshaping our un-
derstanding of human genetics and the delivery of health care, 263
the tests used in the underwriting process 264 have been correspond-
ingly modernized as insurers attempt to further minimize risk.265
Genetic testing, in particular, can indicate if a person is a carrier of
tion, but less perhaps that conscious indifference to the
consequences.
PROSSER AND KEETON, Handbook on Torts 212 (51h ed. 1984).
In the context of municipal liability, for example, gross negligence, not negligence
alone, is required as a basis for liability. See, e.g., Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S.
257, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 94 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1987) (noting that deliberate indifference or
reckless disregard is required to hold a municipality liable).
260 In Northon v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 731 (89 S.E.2d 809) (1955), the
court recognized certain public policy considerations and held: "The duty of a
physician . . . to bring skill and care to the amelioration of the condition of [an
examinee] arises not only from the implied contract between physician and pa-
tient, but such duty also has its foundation in public considerations which are insep-
arable from the nature and exercise of his calling and is predicated by the law on the
relation which exists between physician and patient which is a result of a consen-
sual transaction, and not necessarily one of contract (emphasis added). See also
Peace v. Weisman, 186 Ga. App. 697, 368 S.E.2d 319 (1988) (Dean, J., dissenting,
remarking that given the realities of an examiner/examinee situation, public policy
demands imposing a duty of disclosure. To hold otherwise "denies a remedy for a
wrong, fosters irresponsibility on the part of ... consulting physicians, and may
allow [depriving] a human being of a fighting chance to live").
261 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 152-153.
262 Statement of Rep. Cliff Sterns, Technological Advances in Genetic
Testing: Implications for the Future, 1996: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the
Subcomm. on Tech. of the House Comm. on Science, 10 4t
h Cong. 4 (1996)
(addressing concerns of potential abuse resulting from access to genetic tests in the
insurance context).
263 NIH/DOE Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of
Human Genome Research, Genetic Information and Health Insurance, Report of
the Task Force on Genetic Information and Insurance, at 1 (1993).
264 See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the un-
derwriting process.
265 Greenwald, supra note 7, at 136.
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a mutated266 gene, and therefore, determine if an individual may be
predisposed or presymptomatic for a particular disease.2 67 As a re-
sult of this advanced technology, insurance companies will soon
have the ability to identify individuals with predispositions to par-
ticular diseases, and thereby, more accurately and readily deter-
mine the probability that an applicant's longevity will be
reduced. 268 Some believe that this encourages life insurance com-
panies to discriminate2 69 against those individuals with predisposi-
tions to disease.270 This has fueled controversy regarding the
underwriting process.2 71 Specifically, opponents assert that genetic
testing in the life insurance industry provides the potential for
abuse.2 72 In contrast, the insurance industry asserts that a proscrip-
266 A mutation is a change in a gene potentially capable of being transmitted
to offspring. See TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1163 ( 1 6
th ed.
1989) [hereinafter, TABER'S].
267 See Christopher M. Keefer, Bridging the Gap Between Life Insurer and
Consumer in the Genetic Testing Era: The RF Proposal, 74 IND. L.J. 1375 (1999).
268 Chetan Gulati, Genetic Antidiscrimination Laws in Health Insurance: A
Misguided Solution, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 149 (2001).
269 "Genetic discrimination" has been defined as "the denial of rights, privi-
leges or opportunities on the basis of information obtained from genetically-based
diagnostic and prognostic tests." Larry Gostin, The Human Genome Initiative and
the Impact of Genetic Testing and Screening Technologies: The Use of Genetically
Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests By Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J. L.
AND MED. 109 (1991). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Telles v.
Commissioner of Insurance, 574 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1991) defined "unfair discrimi-
nation" in the context of insurance as "that which treats individuals of the same
class and equal expectation of life differently." 574 N.E.2d at 361-362.
270 See Bryce A. Lenox, Genetic Discrimination in Insurance and Employ-
ment: Spoiled Fruits of the Human Genome Project, 23 DAYTON L. REV. 189, 191
(1997); Schneider, supra note 286, at 377, 378 (noting that genetic discrimination
by insurers may result in denied insurance, limitations in coverage, or higher pre-
miums for coverage).
271 See generally, Proceedings of the International Symposium on Law and
Science at the Crossroads: Biomedical Technology, Ethics, Public Policy, and the
Law: What Should Be the Role of State and Federal Government in Regulating
Genetic Data?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1547 (1993) [hereinafter, INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM]. Compare Carol Lee, Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potential
for Genetic Discrimination by the Health Insurance Industry, 13 PACE L. REV. 189
(1993), with Roberta B. Meyer, International Symposium on Law and Science at
the Crossroads: Biomedical Technology, Ethics, Public Policy, and the Law: Justifi-
cation for Permitting Life Insurers to Continue to Underwrite on the Basis of Ge-
netic Information and Genetic Test Results, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1271 (1993).
272 See Lenox, supra note 270, at 190, and see Keefer, supra note 267, at 1387
(both describing a case in which a mother was denied life insurance for her two
children because one was afflicted with Hurler Syndrome. The rejection letter
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tion of the use of genetic testing in the underwriting process could
have adverse effects on the industry as a whole.273
The Human Genome Initiative274 ("HGI") is a congressional
effort aimed at identifying and sequencing every human gene in an
effort to "decode" the genome 75 and apply that knowledge to ad-
stated that the child was denied coverage because the condition is fatal, but failed
to address the reason for denying coverage to the unafflicted child). Similarly, a
1996 survey of 332 people in families at risk for a genetic disease found that 25%
believed that either they or a family member were unfairly refused life insurance.
Lenox, supra note 270, at 194. Another study found that people who were at risk
for genetic disease and were classified as standard risk refused to get tested, be-
cause they believed that their insurance would be denied if the results came back
positive for the disease. Lisa N. Geller, Individual, Family, and Societal Dimen-
sions of Genetic Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis, 2 Sci. & ENGINEERING
ETHICS 71, 79 (1996). In addition, "the fact that certain genetic diseases are often
associated with specific ethnic or racial groups such as African Americans (e.g.,
sickle cell disease), Ashkenazi Jews (e.g., Bloom's Syndrome, adult form Gaucher's
disease, Tay-Sachs disease), or Armenians (e.g., Familial Mediterranean Fever) in-
creases the potential for invidious discrimination." Gostin, supra note 269, at 111.
See also Marvin R. Natowicz, Genetic Discrimination and the Law, 50 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 465 (1992) (explaining how "the practice of genetic discrimination has
the potential of creating a new group of disadvantaged people who will need the
same protections now accorded those suffering from race and sex discrimination").
273 Id., at 197; Meyer, supra note 271, at 1273 (asserting that a denial of the
right to underwrite on the basis of all medical information would prevent insur-
ance industry survival). See also infra notes 306-313 for further examination of the
position of the life insurance industry.
274 Officially starting October 1, 1989, the HGI is a joint venture primarily
involving the National Institute of Health and the United States Department of
Energy. Jendusa, infra note 276 at 172. The project is scheduled to last fifteen
years, and cost and estimated three billion dollars. Id., at 172-173; Lee, supra note
271, at 195. The goal of the project is to map and sequence the structure of all
human genes, which includes disease-causing genes hidden within the DNA struc-
ture. Lee, supra note 271 at 195. The HGI is intended to identify the estimated
80,000 genes existing in human DNA, and determine the sequences of the 3 billion
chemical base pairs that compromise human DNA. This detailed information, it is
expected, "will be the key to understanding the structure, organization, and func-
tion of DNA in chromosomes." Jendusa, infra note 276 at 175, 176. The HGI is
expected to enhance the ability to identify and individual's predisposition to ge-
netic disease, which may effectively facilitate intervention procedures to prevent
and treat genetic disorders. Id. For a detailed history of the HGI, see Robert
Mullon Cook-Degan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 RISK, HEALTH,
SAFETY, & ENV'T 97 (1994).
275 The human genome is defined as "all the information stored in a complete
strand of human DNA." See Jeremy A. Colby, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimina-
tion Legislation Proposed by the 1 05th Congress, 24 AM. J. L. AND MED. 443 (1998);
Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Di-
lemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky. L. J. 503, 521 (1997).
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vance the scientific and medical community.276 As a result of the
HGI, scientists will be able to identify increasingly greater number
of genetic dispositions and diseases of the human body.277 This
knowledge allows for the detection 278 of genetic sequences that
cause disease, which life insurers can use as a basis for declination
of coverage. 279 Currently, genetic tests can indicate predispositions
to discrete conditions, such as cystic fibrosis,280 sickle cell anemia,281
Huntington's Disease, 282  Neurofibromatosis, 283  hemochro-
matosis, 284 and Duchene muscular dystrophy,285 and an individual's
susceptibility to physical conditions, including cancer, 286 heart dis-
276 See Human Genome Project Information at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/
project/about.html (visited July 16, 2001); Jennifer M. Jendusa, Pandora's Box Ex-
posed: Untangling the Web of the Double Helix In Light of Insurance and Managed
Care, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 161, 172-177 (1999).
277 See Lenox, supra, note 270, at 190.
278 Genetic tests identify diseases by isolating a DNA "marker," an "unusual
DNA sequence that is believed to be inherited with a disease causing gene." Lee,
supra note 271, at 190.
279 See Colby, supra note 275, at 452 (noting that insurers have already begun
to genetically discriminate against consumers); Holmes, supra note 275, at 514
(noting that historically, as more predictive diagnostic tests became available,
more and broader risk classifications were established, and consequently, insurers
underwrote and protected fewer people).
280 Lenox, supra note 270, at 194.
281 Lenox, supra note 270, at 194.
282 Huntington's disease is what geneticists call a "one hundred percent pene-
trant"-100% of individuals possessing the genotype will die from the disease, un-
less the individual dies of something, else first. Henry T. Greely, Speech: The
Revolution in Human Genetics: Implications for Human Societies, 52 S.C. L. REV.
377, 382 (2001).
283 Gostin, supra note 269, at 114.
284 A disorder of iron metabolism, considered to be genetically determined,
and characterized by excess deposition of iron in the tissues. See DORLAND'S MED-
ICAL DICTIONARY 747 (2 8th ed. 1994); MERCK MANUAL at 1146-1147. People with
hemachromatosis are generally denied life insurance unless they receive regular
withdrawals of blood, reducing the potential for liver and heart damage by reduc-
ing iron levels. Keefer, supra note 267, at 1387. See also Paul. R. Billings, Discrim-
ination as a Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476, 478
(1992) (insurance company denied coverage due to hereditary hemochromatosis,
despite the fact that the applicant was asymptomatic and never underwent pre-
ventative treatment).
285 Gostin, supra note 269, at 110.
286 Id.; Lee, supra note 271, at 190 (lung cancer); See also, Katherine A.
Schneider, Legal Protections for Individuals with HIV, Genetic Predispostions to
Disease, or Asymptomatic Diseases, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 365, 367
(2000), noting that women who inherit BRCA1/2 mutations have increased life-
time risks of breast cancer (50-85%), ovarian cancer (10-40%), and other types of
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ease, 287 Alzheimer's disease, 288 schizophrenia, 289 and manic depres-
sive illness.290 Though benefits may ensue from increased genetic
testing,291 some believe that as our ability to detect predispositions
toward illness increases, so too does the threat that such detection
will be used as a basis for discrimination, thus intensifying conflict
between the rights of individuals and institutions.
292
Predicating a decision on whether to extend to an applicant a
life insurance policy based on the possibility that he or she might
one day develop a disease or condition is problematical. 293 Genetic
test results typically indicate a predisposition to a disease, not a con-
clusive diagnosis-the results of such tests usually only reflect in-
creased or decreased susceptibility to a particular disease.
294
Further, the severity of symptoms, age of onset, and efficacy of
treatment and management of disease are highly variable. 295 Some
individuals possessing a DNA marker for disease may remain symp-
cancer. Men who inherit the mutation may have small, increased risks of breast
and pancreatic cancer. Id.
287 Gostin, supra note 269, at 110.
288 See Mark A. Rothstein, Symposium Article: Predictive Genetic Testing for
Alzheimer's Disease in Long-Term Care Insurance, 35 GA. L. REV. 707 (2001).
289 Gostin, supra note 269, at 110.
290 See Jon Beckwith, The Human Genome Initiative and the Impact of Ge-
netic Testing and Screening Technologies, 17 AM. J. L. AND MED. 1, 4 (1991).
291 Such benefits include disease prevention through genetic counseling and
treatment of disorders through genetic manipulation. Gostin, supra note 269, at
110. See also Beckwith, supra note 290, noting that those individuals who are de-
termined by a genetic test to be susceptible to a particular disease may be able to
alter their diet, environment, or working conditions to reduce the probability of
developing the disease. Id. at 8; Lee, supra note 271, at 191, 192 (acknowledging
benefit of early detection for predisposition to illness which creates opportunity for
preventative care).
292 Id.; Gostin, supra note 269, at 142 (noting potential harm of rendering
human beings virtually uninsurable).
293 Natalie E. Zindorf, Discrimination in the 21" Century: Protecting the Pri-
vacy of Genetic Information in Employment and Insurance, 36 TULSA L.J. 703, 708
(2001) (designating this as discrimination).
294 Colby, supra note 275, at 455; Beckwith, supra note 290, at 5 (asserting
that though some diseases are correlated with an altered gene, that, in itself, does
not mean that those diseases are related to those susceptibility genes-actual de-
velopment of disease is due to many factors, including other genes and the
environment).
295 Gostin, supra note 269, at 114. It is not even possible to predict age of
onset or disease course with Huntington's disease, a condition with 100% pene-
trance. Schneider, supra note 286, at 379.
90 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
tom free, while illness in others progresses to a debilitating state.
296
Gene penetrance 297 and expressivity298 differ from individual to in-
dividual.299 Genetic tests do not reflect the role in which environ-
mental factors affect the manifestation of diseases with a genetic
component.300 Appropriately, consumers are concerned that "in-
surers may misunderstand, misinterpret, and misuse genetic infor-
mation in creating risk classifications and excluding or limiting
insurance coverages."
301
According to scientists, every individual possesses a genetic al-
teration of some form.302 Given the universality of genetic defects,
296 Id. Many gene associated diseases are multi-factorial, and not attributed
to a single gene mutation or genetic marker-accordingly, manifestation of these
diseases depends on a "complex interaction[ I of genetic and environmental factors
that cannot be accurately measured." Id.; Keefer, supra, note 267, at 1378 (noting
that multi-factorial conditions may never manifest themselves in the absence of
other factors). See also, Zindorf, supra note 293, at 705, contrasting multi-factorial
genetic conditions, which will not develop unless certain behavioral and environ-
mental factors come into play, and single-gene conditions, which virtually guaran-
tee that a person will develop the genetic disease; Lee, supra note 271, at 199,
remarking that genetic testing is not based on causality, but correlation, and that
an identified gene will not always result in illness; Gostin, supra note 269, at 116.
297 (the ability of a gene to express itself in a person). TABER'S supra note
266, at 1349.
298 (the degree and manner in which a gene manifests itself once it is pene-
trated). TABER'S supra note 266, at 638.
299 Keefer, supra note 267, at 1380.
30 Keefer, supra note 267, at 1380.
301 Holmes, supra note 275, at 530. See also Colby, supra note 275, at 456,
where the author notes that genetic tests cannot accurately indicate health risk,
because they doesn't provide information about a person's "'actual state of
health."' (quoting Holmes, supra note 275). What concerns most is that insurers
will misuse genetic information because it is often accorded a notion of exactitude.
See Susan O'Hara, The Use of Genetic Testing in the Health Insurance Industry:
The Creation of a "Biological Underclass," 22 Sw. L. REV. 1211, 1215-1216 (1993).
See also Holmes, supra note 275, at 530-531, remarking on the National Institute of
Health's 1995 report cautioning against over reliance on genetic test results due to
results that reduce conditions or disease to "an expression of particular genes ("re-
ductionism"), or results that improperly label an individual as "sick or abnormal"
("determinism"); Gostin, supra note 269, at 113, 114: "The common belief is that
genetic technologies generated from scientific assessment are always accurate,
highly predictive and capable of identifying an individual's ... inevitable pre-desti-
nation of future disability. The facts are diametrically opposed to this common
belief." The reliability of genetic tests is also limited by mutations that can cause
the same condition. Lee, supra note 271, at 198, 199; Office of Technology Assess-
ment, Medical Testing and Health Insurance 18 (1988) at 135-140.
302 Zindorf, supra note 293, at 712; Lawrence 0. Gostein & James G. Hodge,
Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40
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insurers will increasingly eliminate potential insurance consum-
ers.30 3 Thus, those who most need insurance are being denied cov-
erage based on genetic testing.30 4 Adverse insurance decisions are
particularly distressing when rendered on erroneous assumptions
regarding the accuracy and predictability of genetic test results.305
Alternatively, insurers contend that use of genetic information
in the underwriting process is merely a more refined method of risk
classification. 30 6 While insurers acknowledge that the underwriting
process is discriminatory 30 7 in nature, they argue that it constitutes
"fair discrimination" 30 8 because it is based on "sound actuarial
JURIMETRICS J. 21, 37 (1999). It is estimated that every human being has between
four to eight genetic defects. O'Hara, supra note 301, at 1224.
303 Marcelita C. Anderson, Genetic Testing in Insurance Underwriting: A
Blessing or a Curse? An Examination of the Tension Between Economics and Eq-
uity in Using Genetic Testing in Risk Classification, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1499,
1508 (discussing possibility of genetic underclass arising); Lee, supra note 271, at
204-205 (recognizing public fear of generating a genetic underclass). For a re-
sponse to this argument, see Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and
the End of Insurance, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 206-207 (1996). Because
everyone possesses genetic defects, insurers could not eliminate all insurds from
the insurance pool, because this would extinguish the market for insurance.
Rather, the insurer would eliminate coverage for the specific genetic predisposi-
tions for each insured, consistent with the economic incentive of writing as many
policies as possible. Id. If insurers deny coverage for a significant percentage of
the population, some believe that this may create a "genetic underclass."
304 Lenox, supra note 270, at 195. Insurers may also begin to consider genetic
predispositions as pre-existing conditions, particularly those revealed from genetic
tests with high predictive value, resulting in extensive limiting of coverage. See
Gostin, supra note 269, at 135-136 (analogizing that hypothetical to the fact that
the insurance industry currently conducts its own HIV testing and regards HIV
infection as an uninsurable condition as a response to epidemiologic evidence
which demonstrated the inexorable course of HIV); Lee, supra note 271, at 206,
207 (noting that if genetic defects qualify as pre-existing conditions, the potential
savings that can result from denying coverage could be significant, and that pre-
existing condition clauses could permit insurers to avoid liability long after a policy
is written).
305 Gostin, supra note 269, at 115.
306 Holmes, supra note 275, at 532.
307 Insurance, by its nature, is discriminatory because individuals who are re-
garded as a higher risk are charged a higher premium. Holmes, supra note 275, at
533. Meyer, supra note 271, at 1280 (arguing that the process of risk classification
"allows economic stimuli to function, which fosters more availability of
coverage").
308 The principle underlying underwriting is "fair discrimination." It is predi-
cated on "efficient, actuarial analysis in establishing risk transference and risk dis-
tribution." Holmes, supra note 275, at 531. In underwriting risks, insurance
companies seek "to measure as accurately as is practicable the burden shifted to
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analysis. ' 30 9 Some believe that a denial to write on the basis of
genetic information would eliminate the process of risk classifica-
tion, and therefore, the current system of insurance would cease to
exist. 310 Insurers also argue that genetic test results are not signifi-
cantly dissimilar from other medical test results that are already
used in the underwriting process. 311 Moreover, insurance industry
advocates contend that prohibiting insurers from obtaining genetic
the insurance fund by the policy holder and to charge and to charge exactly for
it .... To do so is 'fair' discrimination." Id., at 531, 532. Consequently, "the goal of
insurance underwriting is equity; that is, equitable, but not equal treatment of ap-
plicants and policy holders. To achieve that goal, insurers must differentiate
among policyholders by risk classifications and discriminate fairly so that each in-
sured will pay a premium at a level consistent with the risk represented by each
individual insured." Id., at 533. See also Telles v. Commissioner of Insurance, 574
N.E.2d 359, 362 (1991) (unequal treatment of insured who were of different risk
classifications resulted in "fair" discrimination); Keefer, supra note 267, at 1384
(asserting that "fair" and "unfair" discrimination must be distinguished from each
other).
309 Holmes, supra note 275, at 539; Keefer, supra note 267, at 1385, 1386.
310 Meyer, supra note 271, at 1272, 1273.
311 The position of the American Council for Life Insurance is that "genetic
information is as potentially relevant to risk classification as is any other health
information." INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 271, at 1547. For example,
insurers currently underwrite on the basis of an applicant's medical history, includ-
ing static factors (age, sex, genotype) and diverse factors (occupation, diet, to-
bacco/alcohol/drug use). Holmes, supra note 275, at 538. These factors statistically
make the manifestation of illness more or less likely. Id; Colby, supra note 275, at
462. Therefore, insurers contend that they should be allowed continued access to
information that they already have access to. Id; Meyer, supra note 271, at 1272,
1273 ("Because almost all diseases or conditions are being found to have a genetic
basis or component, a denial of the right to underwrite on the basis of genetic
information or genetic tests would be equivalent to a denial of the right to under-
write on the basis of all medical information."), quoting the American Council for
Life Insurance; Lee, supra note 271, at 208 (remarking how insurers argue that
genetic testing is analogous to current insurance classification techniques).
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information will encourage adverse selection,3 2 evoking concern
for pervasive insurer insolvency.
313
Whether one regards the use of genetic testing in the under-
writing process as reasonable or not depends on how the insurance
industry is viewed. If the industry is regarded strictly as a business,
one cannot condemn the industry for discriminating on the basis of
actuarial data-underwriting fundamentally requires classification
of applicants according to risk, thus, effectively, treating applicants
differently.31 4 If, however, the insurance industry is viewed as an
instrument of social policy, risk classification on the basis of genetic
information becomes troublesome. The social purpose of insurance
312 Adverse selection is the tendency of an individual to apply for insurance,
knowing he or she is in poor health, while concealing that fact from the insurer.
Meyer, supra note 271, at 1289 (defining adverse selection as the "tendency of
persons who are poorer risks to seek insurance to a greater extent that do persons
who are better risks"); Holmes, supra note 275, at 543 ("If an insurer cannot distin-
guish and classify high-risk from low-risk applicants, the insurer must offer all ap-
plicants the same premium for the same coverage. Low-risk applicants are then
worse off and high-risk applicants are better off than in a properly functioning
insurance risk classification system."); Lee, supra note 271, at 207, 208 (noting that
if genetic information remains undisclosed, it unfairly burdens the low-risk group).
However, Dr. Paul R. Billings, Professor, Department of Medicine at Stanford
University, believes that adverse selection is a trivial issue for the life insurance
industry, similar to the extra cost that results from shoplifting, but nevertheless
does not prevent people from shopping. INTERNATIONAL SYMPOsIUM, supra note
271, at 1552. Similarly, others contend that the adverse selection argument is un-
persuasive. See, e.g., Richard H. Underwood & Ronald G. Cadle, Genetics, Ge-
netic Testing, and the Specter of Discrimination: A Discussion Using Hypothetical
Cases, 85 Ky. L. J. 665, 686 (1997), where the authors maintain that if all insurers
are affected by adverse selection due to a prohibition on the use of genetic infor-
mation, no single insurer would be at a disadvantage relative to the insurance in-
dustry as a whole. Furthermore, "insurance is a method of risk-sharing against the
unknown, and the more the unknown becomes knowable in advance, the less the
current system makes sense." Richard A. Bornstein, Genetic Discrimination Insur-
ability and Legislation: A Closing of Legal Loopholes, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 551, 609.
313 T.H. Cushing, Should There be Genetic Testing in Insurance Risk Classifi-
cation?, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 254, 255 (1993). If risks are not properly assessed
two scenarios could potentially arise: (1) the insurer will have insufficient funds to
pay claims submitted unless it overcharges those who are at low risk; (2) if the
insurer overassesses and overcharges, the competitive nature of the market would
cause people to purchase insurance elsewhere. Holmes, supra note 275, at 538
(asserting that accurate risk assessment is essential to the business of insurance.
314 Gostin, supra note 269, at 136. "From a business perspective, no rational
distinction can be drawn between genetic prognosis and smoking, hypertension,
high serum cholesterol or HIV infection. In each case, medical data can provide
powerful predictions of future health and longevity." Id.
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is to extend risk across groups, which expands access to insur-
ance.315 If insurance becomes unavailable to those who most likely
will need it, "the social purpose of insurance is thwarted." 316 Un-
doubtedly, life insurers have a responsibility to promote social jus-
tice.317 Nonetheless, though the industry must be responsive to
social needs, it need not ignore actuarial and economical
realities.318
In 1989, the American Council on Life Insurance first deter-
mined the industry's use of genetic testing.319 The Council reported
that while no insurance company had performed its own .tests, some
companies accessed genomic information for use in their underwrit-
ing procedures. 320 At the present time, though life insurers do not
require genetic testing of all applicants, some insurers currently re-
quire genetic testing of some applicants. 321 As genetic testing be-
comes more used, as anticipated, it will become increasingly
necessary for life insurers to underwrite on the basis of their re-
suits. 322 Though states have taken steps in an effort to eliminate
genetic discrimination in the health insurance industry and the em-
ployment context, they have not done so with life insurance. 323 As
315 Gostin, supra note 269, at 137.
316 Id. Opponents of genetic testing assert that public policies for insurance
should be consistent with public policies regarding genetics. Specifically, these pol-
icies should include: (1) not discouraging individuals who want to have genetic
testing from doing so because of concerns that test results may be accessible to
third parties; (2) not coercing individuals who do not want genetic testing into
doing so; (3) protecting the privacy and confidentiality of genetic information.
Rothstein, supra note 288, at 728.
317 This is required by state unfair trade practices acts. Meyer, supra note
271, at 1274.
318 To the contrary, "selection and classification of risk [historically have]
been recognized as an absolute necessity, vital to sound and actuarial [and hence,
fairness in] evaluation of risks." Id., quoting S. Gerber, The Economic and Actua-
rial Aspects of Selection and Classification, 10 FORUM 1205, 1224 (1975).
319 Gostin, supra note 269, at 116.
320 Id.
321 See The Council for Responsible Genetics, Genetic Testing and Life & Dis-
ability Insurance (visited July 16, 2001) <http://www.gene-watch.org/programs/GD-
FAQ-Life_lns.html>, providing that a documented number of cases exist where
consumers have been denied insurance on the basis of their family history, and
were subsequently informed that their application would be reconsidered if they
consented to genetic testing.
322 Meyer, supra note 271, at 1277.
323 Greely, supra note 282, at 383. Several reasons exist for why the public
policy issues surrounding life insurance differ from health insurance: (1) life insur-
ance is usually sold as an individual rather than a group policy and therefore is
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a result of the failure of the legislature to confront the genetic test-
ing dilemma, the life insurance company may adopt its use of ge-
netic testing as another tool, similar to those used by their own
actuarials, or as an extension of the medical exam complete with
the patient's history, to determine applicant insurability. Like all
tools, genetic tests can be used well or poorly.324 Fear of discrimi-
nation can undermine whatever benefits might be derived from
timely developments in genetic technology.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Note advocates a proposal entirely consistent with the life
insurance applicant's inherent right to be apprised of his or her
medical information. Since a statutory duty of disclosure does not
exist in New York, individuals' lives have not been protected and
preserved. 325 Although the duty element in a negligence action is
defined as "an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to
protection, ' 326 courts have held that no duty of disclosure is owed
without engaging in an analysis of the duty issue.3 27 Since courts
have refused to impose this much needed duty on insurance compa-
nies, applicants afflicted with an unknown medical condition that
have submitted to medical exams have lost potentially valuable
treatment time.328 In addition, nondisclosure may also expose third
medically underwritten on an individual basis; (2) a greater likelihood of adverse
selection exists because life insurance coverage may be of unlimited amounts; (3)
unlike health insurance, life insurance is not viewed as a necessity. Rothstein,
supra note 288, at 724. See also INTERNATIONAL SYMPOsIUM, supra note 271, at
1550 (representative of American Council for Life Insurance remarking that life
insurance is unique, in that it is typically individually underwritten, an therefore,
the life insurer is particularly vulnerable to overselection); Bornstein, supra note
312, at 608 (author notes that dissimilar protection against health and life insur-
ance discrimination is consistent with social policy because few feel that life insur-
ance is a basic right, and that adverse selection plays an integral role in considering
life insurance and genetic discrimination).
324 Greely, supra note 282, at 390 ("[Tlhey will give us a greater ability to
cure or prevent human suffering; they also give us a greater ability to inflict such
suffering.").
325 See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
326 Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp at 251.
327 See supra notes 37-130 and accompanying text; Greenwald, supra note 7,
at 136.
328 See supra notes 168-188 and accompanying text.
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parties to unknown health risks.329 Existing precedent, therefore,
yields unsatisfactory results.330 The notification provision proposed
by this Note would provide insurance companies with clear guide-
lines to enable them to inform their applicants and third parties of
health risks.331 As such, New York mandatory disclosure legislation




329 See supra notes 189-208 and accompanying text.
330 See supra notes 37-130 and accompanying text; Greenwald, supra note 7,
at 167. See also Petrosky, 718 N.Y.S.2d 340, where the court was reluctant to im-
pose mandatory disclosure due to the absence of a statutorily imposed duty.
331 See supra notes 234-250 and accompanying text.




PROPOSED MODEL NEW YORK STATE DISCLOSURE
STATUTE § 2611A
(1) DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this section, the following terms shall have the fol-
lowing meanings:
"Adverse underwriting decision" means (a) a declination of insur-
ance coverage as applied for, or (b) an offer to issue insurance cov-
erage at a higher than standard rate.
"Unfavorable medical test" means test results that indicate that an
individual possesses an adverse medical condition, which if left un-
attended to, will result in loss of treatment time or health risks to
third parties. Such results include, but are not limited to blood
counts that indicate the presence of an abnormality, blood profiles
which reveal the presence of antibodies or antigens to the HIV vi-
rus, elevated lipid levels, antibodies to hepatitis, positive tuberculo-
sis readings, and tests that reveal abnormal liver or kidney function.
"HIV Virus" means infection with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus or any other related virus identified as a probable causative
agent of AIDS."
"AIDS" means acquired immune deficiency syndrome, as may be
defined from time to time by the centers for disease control of the
United States Public Health Service.
"Designee" means a health care provider who is licensed, certified,
registered, or otherwise authorized by law to provide an item, ser-
vice, or disclose information that constitutes health care in the ordi-
nary course of business or practice of a profession.
"Health care" means:
(A) any sale or dispensing of a drug, device, equipment, or
other item to an individual, pursuant to a prescription,
and
(B) any preventative, predictive, diagnostic, therapeutic, re-
habilitative, maintenance, or palliative care, counseling,
service, or procedure
(i) with respect to the physical or mental condition of
the individual, or
20011
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
(ii) affecting the structure or function of the human
body or any part of the human body
"Insurer" means the insurance company with whom contracts be-
tween the company and policy holders, whereby the company
agrees, in return for premium payments, to pay a specified sum to
the designated beneficiary upon the death of the insured.
(2) OBLIGTATIONS OF INSURER
(a) In the event that an insurer's adverse underwriting decision
is based in whole or in part on the result of an unfavorable
medical test, the insurer shall notify the individual of the ad-
verse underwriting decision and ask the individual to elect in
writing, unless the individual has already done so, whether to
have the specific related test results disclosed directly to the
individual or to such other person as the individual may desig-
nate ("designee").
(b) An insurer who has materially failed to comply with the
provisions of this section shall be subject to the sanctions pro-
vided in Section 2611A(4).
(3) BREACH OF DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION OF INSURER
(a) An insurer shall be liable, to the extent and in the manner
provided in Section 2611A(2), to the individual proposed for
insurance coverage for all damages incurred as a result of the
insurer's failure to disclose under Section 2611A(2). The mo-
vant shall have the burden of proving a failure to disclose.
(b) Whether an insurer failed to satisfy the disclosure stan-
dards set forth in Section 2611A(2) shall be determined by tak-
ing into account all material facts and circumstances involved
in the dispute. Unless the context provides otherwise, the fol-
lowing factors shall be taken into account in determining
whether the insurer failed to adequately disclose the results of
an adverse medical test:
(1) the extent to which an individual proposed for insur-
ance coverage could have avoided death or result-
ing physical harm through medical treatment




(2) the extent to which an individual proposed for insur-
ance coverage could have avoided exposing third
parties to physical harm due to lack of disclosure on
the part of the insurer;
(3) the severity of physical harm that an insured could
reasonably expect to occur as a result of the insurer's
failure to disclose;
(4) the burden disclosure would have imposed on the
insurer;
(5) the affirmative steps the insurer took in an effort to
apprise the individual proposed for insurance of his
or her adverse medical condition;
(6) the feasibility of informing the individual proposed
for insurance coverage or designee; and
(7) any other relevant circumstances
(c) A duty to disclose can be satisfied by delivering a written
report to the applicant's treating physician, and shall constitute
prima facie evidence of adequate disclosure.
(4) REMEDIES
(a) Any insurer who has materially failed to comply with this
statute shall be subject, in addition to any other penalties that
may be prescribed by law, to:
1. A civil penalty of not less than $ for each
such violation, but not to exceed $ , and not
to exceed $ in the aggregate for multiple vio-
lations in any one year;
2. actual damages; and
3. punitive damages
(b) In the case of a civil action brought by an aggrieved party
brought under Subsection 2611A(2)(a) in which the movant
has prevailed, the court may assess against the respondent a
reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs and ex-
penses (including expert fees) reasonably incurred.
(5) EFFECTIVE DATE
This statute shall become effective
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